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TAMING THE MILITARY’S POST-TRIAL
LEVIATHAN: REFORMS THAT COULD SAVE
THE MILITARY UP TO $170 MILLION
EACH YEAR
Major Ryan A. Little*
Sexual assault in the military has unleashed a firestorm of national
media attention and a sense of urgency among lawmakers who are con-
sidering major changes to the military justice system.  No area of mili-
tary justice is more ripe for reform than the military’s unique post-trial
system—and not merely because of the role it played in fueling the ongo-
ing controversy.
This Article proposes reforms to the military’s post-trial process to
more closely align it with civilian procedural standards and bring the
resource burden to a more fair and sustainable level.  Methodically com-
paring the military’s post-trial system with civilian post-trial systems
demonstrates that a civilian death sentence and a military misdemeanor
guilty plea trigger roughly equivalent levels of post-trial procedure.  Re-
form is necessary in part because the military’s unusually resource-in-
tensive post-trial system has grown so expansive that the United States
must forgo valuable warfighting capabilities in order to pay for it.  Re-
form is also necessary because the historical circumstances that once
justified the military’s unique system no longer apply.
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One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things just doesn’t belong,
Can you tell which thing is not like the others
By the time I finish my song?1
INTRODUCTION
A guilty plea for marijuana use in the military justice system un-
leashes a post-trial process that rivals (and in many ways exceeds) the
protections afforded to a civilian condemned to die.2  A convicted ser-
1 Sesame Street (PBS television broadcast).
2 See infra Appendix A (comparing the post-trial process that follows a civilian’s death
penalty conviction in California state court against the post-trial process that follows a Sol-
dier’s guilty plea for marijuana use).  In seven of ten categories, the Soldier’s misdemeanor-
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vicemember whose sentence does not include confinement3 may none-
theless enjoy elaborate procedural safeguards that include automatic
review by an appellate court,4 up to four opportunities for clemency,5
and a defense appellate attorney appointed at the government’s expense
(regardless of the convicted’s financial status).6  A run-of-the-mill guilty
plea7 regularly triggers a military post-trial process that requires at least
four judges,8 six attorneys,9 a general officer,10 and an average of five
hundred-seventy days to complete.11  No other U.S. jurisdiction provides
level guilty plea triggers a post-trial process that exceeds the protections afforded to a civilian
condemned to die. See infra Appendix A.  The post-trial process is roughly equivalent in the
remaining three categories. See infra Appendix A.
3 Assume the court-martial sentenced the servicemember to a punitive discharge from
military service.
4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1201 (2012) [hereinafter
MCM].
5 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (providing pardon authority to the President); MCM, supra
note 4, R.C.M. 1107, 1201 (providing clemency authority to the convening authority and the
service Judge Advocate General); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-130, ARMY CLEMENCY &
PAROLE BD., ¶¶ 1-1, 2-2 (1998) [hereinafter AR 15-130] (providing for clemency through the
Army Clemency and Parole Board and the Secretary of the Army).  However, Congress re-
cently imposed additional limitations on the convening authority’s clemency powers for sexual
assault convictions, adjudged sentences that exceed six months confinement or include a puni-
tive discharge, or convictions for offenses that include a maximum punishment exceeding two
years of confinement.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-66, § 1702, 127 Stat. 672, 954–958 (2013) [hereinafter National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014].  These new limitations apply to offenses that occurred on or after
June 2014. Id. § 1702(d).  Although the military justice system rarely grants clemency, clem-
ency may be even rarer in civilian death penalty cases. Compare Michael J. Marinello, Con-
vening Authority Clemency: Is It Really an Accused’s Best Chance of Relief?, 54 NAVAL L.
REV. 169, 196 (2007) (finding that convening authorities granted clemency in only two percent
of cases between 2003 and 2004), with Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency in
California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 66 (2009) (finding that California
denied all fourteen clemency requests from 1976 to 2009).
6 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1202.
7 Again, assume the court-martial sentenced the servicemember to a punitive discharge
from military service.
8 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2012) [hereinafter
UCMJ] (requiring three judge panels to hear cases at the service courts of criminal appeals);
MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201 (providing for automatic appellate review of sentences
including a punitive discharge).  The fourth judge in this example is the trial judge.  MCM,
supra note 4, R.C.M. 501.
9 The six attorneys are the trial counsel, defense counsel, chief of military justice (pre-
paring post-trial documents), the staff judge advocate (preparing post-trial documents), defense
appellate counsel, and government appellate counsel. See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 501,
1106, 1202.
10 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1107.
11 See E-mail from Homan Barzmehri, Management and Program Analyst, Army Court
of Criminal Appeals, to author (Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015]
(on file with author) (explaining that the average time from sentence until a case was received
at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was 231 days in 2014); E-mail from Homan
Barzmehri, Management and Program Analyst, Army Court of Criminal Appeals, to author
(Jan. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015] (on file with author) (explaining
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its felons with post-trial protections that match the protections the mili-
tary post-trial system provides to a servicemember whose only punish-
ment is a punitive discharge.12  This disparity between military and
civilian post-trial protections raises questions in light of the formal equal-
ity principle that like things should be treated alike.13
More practically, maintaining a post-trial leviathan that overcon-
sumes scarce resources represents a very real decision to cut other capa-
bilities of our military.  Today’s military simultaneously faces fiscal
austerity, a major drawdown in forces, and increasing mission require-
ments.14  Yet the military’s unique post-trial process costs taxpayers ap-
proximately $170 million annually.15  To put it in perspective, this
number roughly equals the annual cost of three infantry battalions (most
of the combat power in an infantry brigade combat team).16  At a time
when budget cuts are forcing the Army to eliminate ten brigade combat
teams (one-quarter of the Army’s overall number), $170 million repre-
sents a noticeable reduction in U.S. combat power.17  As another exam-
ple, the United States devotes annually thirty-four times more resources
to military post-trial than it devotes to countering Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant’s (ISIL) slick social media recruiting campaign, which is
currently a national security strategic priority.18  To further put the re-
that the average processing time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339
days).
12 See infra Part II and Appendix B.
13 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 3 (W.D. Ross trans., 1999) (c. 384
B.C.E.).  Servicemembers should receive more rigorous post-trial protections because of the
nature of service in an all-volunteer military and the military’s two-thirds voting requirement
to convict. See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 921.  However, the military’s two-thirds panel
voting requirement is only relevant towards justifying the post-trial process that follows con-
tested panel cases (not guilty pleas or judge alone courts-martial). See MCM, supra note 4,
R.C.M. 921, 1103–1204 (providing the same post-trial process without regard to plea or fo-
rum).  Additionally, the persuasiveness of all justifications for heightened protections for ser-
vicemembers wane for cases in which the punishments approach the low end of the spectrum.
See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103–1204 (requiring the same post-trial process regardless
of whether the punishment is a punitive discharge or ten years of confinement).
14 Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., McHugh: America’s Army Facing Sequestration ‘Enemy’ at
Home, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Arti-
cle/604258.
15 See infra Part III.A.4.
16 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
17 Report: Army Accelerating Cuts, Reorganization, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.stripes.com/report-army-accelerating-cuts-reorganization-1.248253 (reporting that
budget cuts are forcing the Army to cut 80,000 Soldiers); Claudette Roulo, Army to Cut 12
Brigade Combat Teams by 2017, Odierno Says, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 25, 2013), http://
archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120361 (explaining that budget cuts are forcing
the Army to reduce the number of brigade combat teams from forty-five to thirty-three by
2017).
18 See Fareed Zakaria GPS (CNN television broadcast Feb. 22, 2015) (discussing the
inter-agency effort with a $5 million budget that is charged with countering ISIL’s information
operations and recruiting on social media).
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source burden in perspective, military post-trial is sixty-four times more
expensive (per capita) than the entire annual budget of the U.S. circuit
courts of appeals.19
It is time to reform the military’s post-trial process to more closely
align it with civilian procedural standards and bring the resource burden
to a more fair and sustainable level.  Servicemembers, military com-
manders, and America as a whole would all benefit from post-trial re-
forms that reduce costs and remove systemic delay from the process, but
continue to provide convicted servicemembers with significant post-trial
protections beyond those available to civilians.  With these goals in
mind, this Article proposes a series of reforms to military post-trial.  The
proposed reforms stand on an appreciation of modern microeconomic
theory, a data-driven cost-benefit analysis of each reform, and a compar-
ative analysis of military and civilian post-trial procedure.
First, this Article will frame the issues by comparing the post-trial
processes triggered by a death sentence in California and a military
guilty plea.  Second, this Article will discuss three modern developments
that justify reforming post-trial.  This section of the Article includes the
first-ever study to calculate the actual costs of the military’s post-trial
system.  It also includes the first-ever study to methodically compare the
military’s post-trial process against civilian post-trial practices in all fifty
states and the federal courts.  Finally, this Article will detail a series of
proposed reforms to the post-trial process.
I. BACKGROUND
To frame the problem, compare the post-trial process that follows a
civilian’s death penalty conviction in California’s state courts with the
post-trial process that follows a servicemember’s guilty plea for mari-
juana use in the military.20  For readers who are unfamiliar with the mili-
tary justice system, this comparison also serves as general overview of
the military post-trial system.21  The military post-trial process described
in this section applies to servicemembers who receive a sentence that
includes confinement for one year or a punitive discharge from military
service.22
19 See infra Part III.B.1.
20 Assume the convicted servicemember is sentenced to reduction in grade, total forfei-
ture of pay, one month confinement, and a Bad-Conduct Discharge at a General Court-Martial.
21 This information is also displayed in a table for ease of comparison. See infra Appen-
dix A.
22 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101–1204.  The military post-trial process required
for a particular court-martial is dictated primarily by the sentence the servicemember receives.
See id.  Plea and forum generally do not impact the military post-trial system. See id.
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In both cases, appellate courts must automatically review the con-
victions, sentences, and trial process.23  While the death penalty case will
take longer to move through its post-trial process, the convicted in either
case should expect years to elapse between their sentencing and the con-
clusion of the post-trial process.24
However, the servicemember enjoys stronger post-trial protections
than the condemned civilian in a variety of areas.  In capital cases, Cali-
fornia provides appellate defense attorneys at taxpayer expense only to
indigent defendants;25 on the other hand, in all appellate cases the mili-
tary provides appellate defense attorneys at no cost to the convicted re-
gardless of the convicted’s ability to pay.26  Both cases generate a
verbatim transcript of the trial process, but only the servicemember’s
transcript is reviewed word-for-word by the court reporter, the prosecu-
tor, the defense attorney, and the judge before it is authenticated.27  Con-
versely, the attorneys and judge in the death penalty case are not required
to directly review the transcript; rather, they review the docket sheets and
minute orders to make sure the record is complete.28  Further, both sys-
tems provide options for clemency, but the servicemember who pleads
guilty to marijuana use enjoys more protections in this area than the Cali-
fornia civilian sentenced to death.  First, up to four separate authorities
are authorized to grant clemency to the servicemember (the court-martial
23 CAL. R. CT. 8.600(a); MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201.
24 OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF CAL., A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE
PROCESS 2, http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf. See
Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11; see also United States v. Grimes, Army
20100720, 2014 CCA LEXIS 63 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Grimes] (un-
published), rev. denied, No. 14-0493, 2014 CAAF LEXIS 829 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 11, 2014) (un-
published).  Post-trial processing exceeded four years, but neither the convening authority nor
the appellate courts recognized post-trial delay as an issue. See id.
25 See CAL. R. CT. 8.605. See also Death Penalty Cases, CAL. COURTS, http://www
.courts.ca.gov/5641.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
26 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1202.
27 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a); CAL. R. CT. 8.320, 8.336–.344, 8.619.
For all California felony convictions, the court reporter prepares and certifies the written tran-
script. CAL. R. CT. 8.320, 8.336–.344, 8.619.  The clerk of the trial court prepares and certifies
the portion of the record that includes the papers, documents, and exhibits used at trial. Id.
After the clerk delivers the certified transcripts, each counsel reviews the docket sheets and
minute orders to determine whether the reporter’s transcript is complete and reviews the court
file to determine whether the clerk’s transcript is complete. Id.  The rules do not require
counsel for either party to read the entire reporter’s transcript. Id.  If any counsel files a
request for additions or corrections, then the judge must also certify the record as complete.
CAL. R. CT. 8.619. Regarding military practice, the requirement for trial defense counsel to
review transcripts prior to authentication is based in local and regional Trial Defense Service
policy.  This assertion is based on the author’s professional experiences across eight years of
military justice practice as a trial counsel, defense counsel, senior trial counsel, command
judge advocate, and chief of military justice from 2007 to 2014 [hereinafter Professional
Experiences].
28 See supra note 27.
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convening authority, the Judge Advocate General, the Clemency and Pa-
role Board, and the President of the United States),29 while only one
authority can grant clemency to the condemned civilian (the Governor).30
Second, the servicemember’s first clemency review is automatic and
mandatory,31 while the civilian must affirmatively petition the Governor
for clemency.32  Third, the California Governor must obtain approval
from the California Supreme Court in order to grant clemency in certain
circumstances,33 while the authorities who would act on the ser-
vicemember’s clemency enjoy largely unfettered power.34  Fourth, the
servicemember enjoys a higher probability of obtaining clemency than
the civilian condemned to die.35
Additionally, the convicted Soldier enjoys a variety of post-trial
procedural entitlements that are wholly absent from the civilian death
penalty process.  For example, the staff judge advocate (a senior military
29 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 5, § 1702.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing pardon authority to the President); MCM, supra note 4,
R.C.M. 1107, 1201 (providing clemency authority to the convening authority and the service
Judge Advocate General); AR 15-130, supra note 5, ¶ 2-2 (providing for clemency through the
Army Clemency and Parole Board and the Secretary of the Army).  However, Congress re-
cently imposed additional limitations on the convening authority’s clemency powers for sexual
assault convictions, adjudged sentences that exceed six months confinement or including a
punitive discharge, or convictions for offenses that include a maximum punishment exceeding
two years confinement.  These new limitations apply to offenses that occurred on or after June
2014. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 5, § 1702.
30 See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.  The President’s civilian pardon authority is limited to
federal offenses. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
31 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1107, 1201.  Clemency by the convening authority or the
service Judge Advocate General can occur without any action from the convicted. Id.  How-
ever, the President of the United States rarely uses his pardon authority unless requested by the
convicted. See Standards for Consideration of Clemency Petitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/about-office-0 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
32 OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, STATE OF CAL., HOW TO APPLY FOR A PARDON (2013), https://
www.gov.ca.gov/docs/How_To_Apply_for_a_Pardon.pdf.
33 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.  For example, the California Supreme Court must recommend
granting a pardon before the Governor can pardon an applicant who has been convicted of
more than one felony.  Id. Also, the Governor may only consider certain factors when acting
on murder case with a sentence to an indeterminate term of confinement. Id.; see also OFFICE
OF GOVERNOR, supra note 32.
34 The President’s clemency power is restricted only as to impeachment. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2.  The Judge Advocate General’s clemency power is unqualified. MCM,
supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201(b)(3).  Clemency is “within the sole discretion of the convening
authority” and “is a matter of command prerogative.” MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M.
1107(b)(1).  However, Congress recently imposed additional limitations on the convening au-
thority’s clemency powers for sexual assault convictions, adjudged sentences that exceed six
months confinement or including a punitive discharge, or convictions for offenses that include
a maximum punishment exceeding two years confinement.  These new limitations apply to
offenses that occurred on or after June 2014.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014 supra note 5, § 1702.
35 Compare Marinello, supra note 5, at 196 (finding that convening authorities grant
clemency in only two percent of cases), with Moylan & Carter, supra note 5, at 66 (finding
that California denied all fourteen clemency requests from 1976 to 2009).
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attorney) must review the servicemember’s conviction and provide writ-
ten recommendations to the court-martial convening authority (a senior
military commander) before the convening authority takes initial action
(i.e., clemency) and forwards the case to the appellate level.36  Also, the
convening authority will often direct that the servicemember continue to
receive his military pay while in confinement (known as deferment or
waiver of forfeitures).37
The above comparison of California’s death penalty conviction and
a military guilty plea indicates that a servicemember who pleads guilty to
a misdemeanor has greater procedural rights than a civilian Californian
who has been sentenced to death.  In seven of ten categories, the Sol-
dier’s misdemeanor-level guilty plea triggers a post-trial process that ex-
ceeds the protections afforded to a civilian condemned to die.38  The
post-trial process is roughly equivalent in the remaining three categories.
Given the vastly more serious punishment facing the condemned civilian,
it is surprising that the servicemember’s guilty plea should trigger supe-
rior procedural protections.
II. MILITARY POST-TRIAL PROCEDURES ARE OUT OF STEP WITH
CIVILIAN PRACTICES AND STANDARDS
The first rationale for reforming military post-trial is that it is out of
step with civilian practice.  Congress passed legislation stating its intent
that military post-trial should broadly mirror federal civilian practice.39
However, the Rules for Courts-Martial and service regulations governing
post-trial have created a military system that is entirely unique.40  No
36 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1106, 1107. See generally CAL. R. CT. 4.1–.700,
8.1–.1125 (after review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has no
procedures that are similar to staff judge advocate review or convening authority initial
action).
37 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101. See generally CAL. R. CT. 4.1–.700,
8.1–.1125.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has
no procedures that are similar to deferment or waiver of forfeitures. The convicted’s punish-
ment often includes forfeiture of pay or reduction in grade (i.e., military rank). See MCM,
supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101.  Deferment is the convening authority’s power to postpone pay
forfeitures or rank reduction until the convening authority takes post-trial action. Id. Waiver
is the convening authority’s power to continue paying salary to the family of the accused for
six months after he takes post-trial action. Id. Waiver only applies to pay forfeitures that
occur as a matter of law, not pay forfeitures adjudged by the court-martial. Id.  Deferments
and waivers of pay forfeitures is a significant government program that costs taxpayers more
than approximately $20.3 million annually. See infra Part III.A.3.
38 See infra Appendix A.
39 See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 36 (“[P]ost-trial procedures . . . for cases . . . triable in
courts-martial . . . may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts . . . .”).
40 See supra Part I; infra Appendix B.  Some of the military’s unique post-trial require-
ments are imposed by statute. See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 64, 66 (requiring appellate review
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other jurisdiction in the United States requires mandatory post-trial re-
view of every criminal conviction.41  No other jurisdiction in the United
States requires that a written transcript be prepared for every criminal
conviction.42  No other jurisdiction in the United States requires that
multiple attorneys review each transcript prior to authentication of the
record upon a criminal conviction.43
The fact that the military and civilian post-trial systems differ sub-
stantially does not by itself mean that military post-trial should be re-
formed.  Yet it raises two questions: (1) are the costs of the military’s
unique post-trial process worth the benefits, and (2) why is the military
system so different?  The following two sections address these issues.
III. POST-TRIAL HAS GROWN INTO A LEVIATHAN THAT DEVOURS
MORE RESOURCES THAN IS JUSTIFIABLE IN THE MODERN,
RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED MILITARY
A second rationale for reforming the military’s post-trial system is
the system’s high budgetary costs.  The courts have focused on the costs
that post-trial delay imposes upon convicted servicemembers.44  Other
commentators have highlighted the indirect costs the current post-trial
system imposes upon commanders and good order and discipline.45  For
example, Navy Captain David Grogan notes that the number of courts-
martial has plummeted in the last ten years as procedural protections
have continued to increase well beyond what is constitutionally re-
quired.46  This reduction in courts-martial reflects commanders’ in-
creased use of adverse administrative actions for cases that would have
previously been tried at court-martial, rather than a decrease in crime.47
Further, “to the extent [c]ommanders are resorting to these options be-
cause courts-martial have become too complex, good order and disci-
pline suffers.”48  Captain Grogan concludes that “[w]ithout . . . reforms
that simplify the military justice system and inject flexibility for the
for all guilty findings).  However, the military imposes many unique post-trial requirements
upon itself.  For example, the requirement that multiple attorneys review every record trial
before authentication is not based in statute. MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103(i).  Further, the
requirement to transcribe courts-martial that resulted in full acquittals or were withdrawn
before trial is contained only in service regulation. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILI-
TARY JUSTICE, ¶ 5-41e (2011) [hereinafter AR 27-10].
41 See infra Appendix B.
42 See infra Appendix B.
43 See infra Appendix B.
44 See United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
45 See Captain David E. Grogan, Stop the Madness! It’s Time to Simplify Court-Martial
Post-Trial Processing, 62 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 28 (2013).
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
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warfighter without compromising fundamental due process rights of the
accused, Commanders will continue to turn to alternative dispositions in
increasing numbers and the practice of military justice will wither on the
vine.”49
However, other commentators have not yet explored the monetary
costs the military’s post-trial system imposes on the taxpayer and the
warfighter.  First, this section quantifies those monetary costs.  Second,
this section attempts to put those costs in context.  By choosing to main-
tain the military post-trial system in its current (resource intensive) form,
policymakers are simultaneously choosing to divert scarce resources
away from other areas where the warfighter needs them.50
A. Quantifying the Monetary Costs of the Military’s Post-Trial
Process
The monetary costs of military post-trial fall into several broad cate-
gories: (1) the pay and benefits paid to personnel who devote all or a
substantial part of their time to post-trial, (2) contracts related to post-
trial, and (3) the pay and non-pay benefits the convicted receives while
his case slowly navigates the post-trial process.
1. Pay and Benefits of Post-Trial Personnel
The pay and benefits of post-trial personnel account for the largest
part of the cost of military post-trial.  However, calculating this number
is not straightforward.  First, no one in the Army knows exactly how
many personnel are engaged in the post-trial process.51  Second, many
post-trial personnel devote only a portion of their time to post-trial.52  In
some cases, this is due to personnel shortages that lead to one ser-
vicemember covering multiple full-time positions.53  In other cases,
smaller jurisdictions may have light-enough caseloads that post-trial is
not a full-time position.  Post-trial personnel for each Army jurisdiction
may include the chief of military justice, the post-trial paralegal, the
court reporter, the attorneys and judges who try each court-martial, the
attorneys at Defense Appellate Division and the Office of the Judge Ad-
49 See id. at 29.
50 See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining the economic theory of opportunity costs).
51 See infra notes 60–66. See generally FORCE MGMT. SYS., https://fmsweb.army.mil
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).  Force management planners use FMSweb to track whether billets
for judge advocates and paralegals are filled, but the system does not track the numbers of
junior enlisted servicemembers performing post-trial positions, does not reflect personnel who
perform post-trial duties as an additional duty, and does not account for the ability of staff
judge advocates to deviate from their unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment or Table of
Distribution and Allowances when assigning personnel at the local level.
52 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-04, LEGAL SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONAL
ARMY ¶ 5-2, 5-12 (2013) [hereinafter FM 1-04].
53 See FORCE MGMT. SYS., supra note 51.
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vocate General who must review each record of trial, and the appellate
judges at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals who must review each
record of trial.54  The exact roster of post-trial personnel varies across
jurisdictions.55
First, the chief of military justice is a jurisdiction’s chief prosecutor
in the Army.  The chief of military justice’s jurisdiction generally (but
not always) matches a general court-martial convening authority’s juris-
diction.56  The chief of military justice supervises the jurisdiction’s pros-
ecuting attorneys (called “trial counsel”), supervises the preparation of
all military justice actions that may require decisions by the general
court-martial convening authority, and supervises the jurisdiction’s post-
trial operations.57  In the Army, there are approximately forty-six chiefs
of military justice (thirty-six majors and ten captains).58  Assuming that
chiefs of military justice spend roughly one-third of their time working
on post-trial issues, the Army spends approximately $3,244,356 each
year on the post-trial efforts of chiefs of military justice.59
54 The staff judge advocate, deputy staff judge advocate, and convening authority also
devote time to post-trial processing. See FM 1-04, supra note 52, ¶ 5-12.  However, this
Article omits them from the calculations because their time commitment is generally minimal.
Additionally, this Article distinguishes between the costs associated with actual appellate liti-
gation versus the costs of mandatory review of every court-martial by the service courts of
criminal appeals or the Office of the Judge Advocate General.  This Article only discusses
costs associated with mandatory review.
55 See PERSONNEL, PLANS, & TRAINING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, 2014–2015 JAGC PERSONNEL DIRECTORY (2014) [hereinafter JAGC
DIRECTORY] (listing judge advocate assignments throughout the Army); see also Telephone
Interview with Major Robert Leone, Chief of Operations, Criminal Law Div., Office of the
Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Army (Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter MAJ Leone Interview].
56 See JAGC DIRECTORY, supra note 55; MAJ Leone Interview, supra note 55; FM 1-04,
supra note 52, ¶ 5-9.
57 See FM 1-04, supra note 52, at para. 5-9.
58 E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel Laura Calese, Field Grade Assignments Officer, Per-
sonnel, Plans, & Training Office, Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Army, to
author (Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter LTC Calese E-mail] (on file with author).  Additionally,
there are several chief of justice positions held by lieutenant colonels.  This Article omits those
positions from its calculations because they are few and their post-trial caseloads are limited.
See JAGC DIRECTORY, supra note 55.
59 The monthly salary for a major with twelve years of service is $6,990.60, and the
monthly salary for a captain with eight years of service is $5,744.10. DEF. FIN. & ACCOUNT-
ING SERV., 2015 MILITARY PAY CHARTS—1949 TO 2015 (2015) [hereinafter MILITARY PAY
CHART 2015], http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/military-pay-charts.html
(follow “Jan. 1, 2015” hyperlink).  The basic allowance for subsistence for officers is $253.38
per month. Id.  The average monthly basic allowance for housing with dependents in the
continental United States is $2,093 for a major and $1,759 for a captain. Regular Military
Compensation (RMC) Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://militarypay.defense.gov/Calcula-
tors/RMCCalculator.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (select O-3 or O-4 for pay grade and
leave duty location blank, but note that this underreports the current rate because it is a prior
year number).  Further, non-cash benefits account for forty-nine percent of the average ser-
vicemember’s total compensation. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEF. FOR PERSONNEL
& READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY COM-
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Second, calculating how much the Army spends on post-trial parale-
gals is more complicated because of the uncertainty surrounding how
many paralegals fill post-trial positions at any given moment.60  First,
Army planners use FMSweb to track the number of personnel required
and authorized under each unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment
(TOA) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).61  However, en-
tries for paralegal positions in FMSweb do not specify the pinpoint as-
signment.62  For example, the TOA for the 82d Airborne Division’s
military justice office lists two authorizations for “paralegal NCO.”63
One of these authorizations is actually for the post-trial paralegal.64  Sec-
ond, FMSweb only lists an authorization as “paralegal” if it is for a non-
commissioned officer, while a post-trial paralegal position may be filled
by an E-4 specialist.65  Third, the local offices of the staff judge advocate
control the pinpoint assignments of paralegals and regularly deviate from
the TOA/TDA.66  To circumvent the uncertainties regarding the number
of post-trial paralegals, this Article assumes that each general court-mar-
tial convening authority that actively prosecutes courts-martial has one
post-trial paralegal.  Given that there are approximately fifty-eight active
general courts-martial convening authorities,67 the Army spends approxi-
PENSATION 17 (2012) [hereinafter ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL] .  Applying these numbers, the
approximate yearly pay for a chief of justice with the rank of major is $112,044.  Divide by
fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash benefits received by each servicemember
($219,694).  Multiplied by thirty-six majors, the sum is $7,908,984.  Assuming that chiefs of
justice spend roughly one-third of their time on post-trial, reduce this sum to one-third to arrive
at the estimated sum the Army spends on the post-trial activities of major chiefs of justice
($2,636,064).  Next, applying the above numbers, the approximate yearly pay for a captain
chief of justice is $93,078.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash
benefits received by each servicemember ($182,506).  Multiplied by ten captains, the sum is
$1,825,060.  Assuming that chiefs of justice spend roughly one-third of their time on post-trial,
reduce this sum to one-third to arrive at the estimated sum the Army spends on the post-trial
activities of captain chiefs of justice ($608,292).  The Army’s total annual total post-trial costs
from chief of justice labor is approximately $2,636,064 + $608,292 = $3,244,356.
60 See FORCE MGMT. SYS., supra note 51.
61 See LTC Calese E-mail, supra note 58.
62 See FORCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 51.
63 See id.
64 Interview with Sergeant First Class Daniel Duncan, Noncommissioned Officer in
Charge, Military Justice Office, 82d Airborne Div., U.S. Dep’t of Army, at Fort Bragg, N.C.
(April 1, 2013).
65 See FORCE MGMT. SYS., supra note 51 (listing “paralegal NCO” for an authorization
that was filled by a junior enlisted E-3).
66 Interview with Master Sergeant Billie Suttles, Force Structure, Combat Developments
Directorate, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Dep’t of Army (Jan. 15,
2015) [hereinafter MSG Suttles Interview].
67 MAJ Leone Interview, supra note 55 (explaining that the number of general court-
martial convening authorities in the Army changes frequently).
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mately $4,929,137 each year on pay and benefits for post-trial
paralegals.68
Third, court reporters in the military justice system are primarily
post-trial personnel.69  For every hour on the record in court, court re-
porters in the military expect to spend between three and six hours pre-
paring the ROT.70  Under current rules, court reporters must laboriously
transcribe every portion of every court-martial (including arraignments,
all motions hearings, all UCMJ Article 39 pre-trial conferences, etc.).71
Transcripts commonly exceed 1,000 pages for a contested trial and
sometimes exceed 10,000 pages.72  While some courts-martial require
summarized transcripts rather than verbatim transcripts, this does not sig-
nificantly alter the burden on court reporters for two reasons.  First, sum-
marized and verbatim transcripts require similar preparation times.73  For
68 The monthly salary for a staff sergeant with eight years of service is $3,261 and the
monthly salary for a sergeant with six years of service is $2,761.80. MILITARY PAY CHART
2015, supra note 59.  The basic allowance for subsistence for enlisted servicemembers is
$367.92 per month. Id.  The average basic allowance for housing with dependents rate in the
continental United States is $1,526 for a staff sergeant and $1,347 for a sergeant. Regular
Military Compensation Calculator, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF., PERSONNEL & READINESS,
http://militarypay.defense.gov/Calculators/RMCCalculator.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015)
(select E-5 and E-6 for pay grade and leave duty location blank) (this underreports the current
rate because it is a prior year number).  Further, non-cash benefits account for forty-nine per-
cent of the average servicemember’s total compensation. See ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL, supra
note 59, at 17. This Article assumes that half of post-trial paralegals are staff sergeants and
half are sergeants. See FORCE MGMT. SYS., supra note 51.  Applying these numbers, the
yearly pay for staff sergeant is $61,859.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of
non-cash benefits received by each servicemember ($121,292).  Multiply by twenty-nine staff
sergeants who hold post-trial paralegal positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost
of $3,517,468.  Next, repeat the same process for sergeants.  Applying the above numbers, the
yearly pay for sergeant is $53,721.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-
cash benefits received by each servicemember ($105,335).  Multiply by twenty-nine sergeants
who hold post-trial paralegal positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost of
$3,054,715.  Combine the Army’s annual costs for both staff sergeants and sergeants to esti-
mate the Army’s total approximate annual cost for post-trial paralegals.  $3,517,468 +
$3,054,715 = $6,572,183.  To account for post-trial paralegals who work in jurisdictions where
it is not a full-time position, reduce the total amount by one-fourth to estimate the Army’s
approximate total annual cost for post-trial paralegals ($4,929,137).
69 See Interview with Sergeant First Class Margarita Abbott, Senior Court Reporter, 82d
Airborne Div., U.S. Dep’t of Army, at Fort Bragg, N.C. (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter SFC
Abbott Interview] (discussing post-trial transcription processing times).
70 See SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69 (explaining that a court reporter normally
spends three to four hours transcribing each hour of court-martial proceedings); Interview with
Staff Sergeant Joshua Glober, Court Reporter Instructor, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal
Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army, at Charlottesville, VA (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter SSG Glober Inter-
view] (explaining that a court reporter normally spends four to six hours transcribing each hour
of court-martial proceedings).
71 MCM, supra note 4.
72 See United States v. Bozicevich (3d Infantry Div., Fort Stewart Aug. 10, 2011)
(14,200 page record of trial); United States v. Lorance (82d Airborne Div., Fort Bragg Aug. 1,
2013) (1,000 page record of trial for two-and-a-half day trial).
73 SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69; SSG Glober Interview, supra note 70.
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summarized transcripts, the court reporter must rely less on assistance
from speech recognition software and rely more on listening to the re-
cordings, taking notes, and then exercising independent thought to sum-
marize witness testimony.74  Second, summarized transcripts are
relatively rare after court-martial convictions.75  To illustrate the amount
of time that goes into transcribing a court-martial, consider the example
of a contested sexual assault court-martial.  Sexual assault prosecutions
commonly require one or two full days of pretrial motions, one or two
pre-trial UCMJ Article 39 sessions for arraignment and administrative
matters, and three-to-five days of trial.76  If the court reporter transcribed
full-time, this common sexual assault trial would require the court re-
porter to spend approximately one month creating the transcript.77  How-
ever, the average transcription time for verbatim transcripts is
approximately six months78 in part because military court reporters never
transcribe full-time.79
Eighty-three uniformed court reporters serve in the Army (twenty
E-7s, twenty-three E-6s, thirty-seven E-5s, and three E-4s) at an approxi-
mate annual cost of $9,760,219.80  Additionally, the Army employs
74 SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69; SSG Glober Interview, supra note 70.
75 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103 (providing for summarized transcripts when the
sentence includes less than six months confinement, no forfeiture of pay that exceeds two-
thirds of pay per month of six months duration, and no punitive discharge); Grogan, supra note
45, at 28 (discussing increased use of adverse administrative actions for cases that would
previously have gone to court-martial).
76 See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, U.S. ARMY, TRIAL JUDICIARY EDOCKET,
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Apps/TJeDocket/usatjedocket.nsf (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
77 See SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69 (explaining that a court reporter normally
spends three to four hours transcribing each hour of court-martial proceedings); SSG Glober
Interview, supra note 70 (explaining that a court reporter normally spends four to six hours
transcribing each hour of court-martial proceedings).  If the court-martial includes seven days
on the record (including pre-trial practice and trial), and if transcription takes three to six hours
per hour of court-martial proceedings, then a standard sexual assault court-martial would take
approximately twenty-one to forty-two days to transcribe.  In reality, the transcription process
would take longer because court reporters have other duties beyond transcription. See FM 1-
04, supra note 52, ¶ 5-12.
78 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (providing data showing that the
average transcription time for courts-martial is approximately 200 days).  Transcription ac-
counts for the bulk of processing time between sentence and initial action by the convening
authority. See SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69.
79 See FM 1-04, supra note 52, ¶ 5-12; SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69. See gener-
ally OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., U.S. ARMY, PUBLICATION 1-1, PERSONNEL POLI-
CIES fig.14-1 (2014) (describing paralegal career progression).  Military court reporters have
many duties beyond transcription, including serving during trial, serving as platoon sergeants,
planning and attending weekly sergeant’s time training, performing details throughout their
unit, etc. See FM 1-04, supra note 52, ¶ 5-12; SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69.
80 See E-mail from MSG Billie Suttles, Force Structure, Combat Developments Director-
ate, Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Dep’t of the Army, to author (Jan. 15,
2015) [hereinafter MSG Suttles E-mail] (on file with author) (including spreadsheet with
Army court reporter staffing numbers).  The monthly salary is $3,953.40 for a sergeant first
class with twelve years of service, $3,261 for a staff sergeant with eight years of service,
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thirty-eight civilian court reporters (one GS-12, one GS-11, nine GS-10s,
twenty-six GS-9s, and one GS-4) at an approximate annual cost of
$2,418,057.81  Combining these numbers, the Army’s total annual cost
$2,761.80 for a sergeant with six years of service, and $2,451.60 for a specialist with six years
of service. MILITARY PAY CHART 2015, supra note 59.  The basic allowance for subsistence
for enlisted servicemembers is $367.92 per month. Id.  The average basic allowance for hous-
ing with dependents rate in the continental United States is $19,212 for a sergeant first class,
$18,312 for a staff sergeant, $16,164 for a sergeant, and $14,808 for a specialist. Regular
Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://militarypay.defense.gov/
Calculators/RMCCalculator.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (select E-7, E-6, or E-5 for pay
grade and leave duty location blank).  Further, non-cash benefits account for forty-nine percent
of the average servicemember’s total compensation. See ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL, supra note
59, at 17, 26.  Applying these numbers, the approximate yearly pay for a sergeant first class is
$71,068.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash benefits received by
each servicemember ($139,349).  Multiply by twenty sergeants first class who hold court re-
porter positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost of $2,786,980.  Next, repeat the
same process for staff sergeants.  Applying the above numbers, the approximate yearly pay for
a staff sergeant is $61,859.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash
benefits received by each servicemember ($121,292).  Multiply by twenty-three staff sergeants
who hold court reporter positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost of $2,789,716.
Next, repeat the same process for sergeants.  Applying the above numbers, the yearly pay for a
sergeant is $53,721.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash benefits
received by each servicemember ($105,335).  Multiply by thirty-seven sergeants who hold
court reporter positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost of $3,897,395.  Next,
repeat the same process for specialists.  Applying the above numbers, the approximate yearly
pay for a specialist is $48,642.  Divide by fifty-one percent to account for the cost of non-cash
benefits received by each servicemember ($95,376).  Multiply by three specialists who hold
court reporter positions to reach the Army’s approximate annual cost of $286,128.  Combine
the Army’s annual costs for all four ranks of court reporters to reach the Army’s approximate
total annual cost of $9,760,219.
81 See MSG Suttles E-mail, supra note 80.  The Army employs civilian court reporters in
the following general schedule (GS) pay grades: one GS-12, one GS-11, nine GS-10s, twenty-
six GS-9s, and one GS-4. Id.  Due to the unavailability of data regarding step levels for indi-
vidual civilian court reporters, this Article assumes for purposes of calculations that all are at
the middle step (step five) of their federal employee GS pay grade.  Thus, the annual salary is
$79,554 for a GS-12 court reporter, $66,370 for a GS-11, $60,408 for a GS-10, $54,855 for a
GS-9, and $32,361 for a GS-4. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SALARY TABLE 2015-RUS (2015)
(displaying locality pay table for the rest of the United States).  To calculate the Army’s cost
for civilian court reporters at each pay grade, multiply the salary by the number of court
reporters at that grade.  GS-12: one court reporter at $79,554.  GS-11: one court reporter at
$66,370.  GS-10: $60,408 salary multiplied by nine court reporters is a total cost of $543,672.
GS-9: $54,855 salary multiplied by twenty-six court reporters is a total cost of $1,426,230.
GS-4: one court reporter at $32,361.  Add the totals for each pay grade to reach the Army’s
approximate total court reporter salary cost of $2,148,187.  Additionally, five of these civilian
court reporters receive overseas living quarters allowances (LQA) and cost of living adjust-
ments (COLA) because they are stationed in Germany.  At the time of writing, the annual
LQA rate for group three in this overseas area was $49,300. Annual Living Quarters Allow-
ance in U.S. Dollars, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://aoprals.state.gov/Web920/
lqa_all.asp?MenuHide=1 (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (rates effective Jan. 25, 2015).  Multiply
the LQA by five personnel to reach the Army’s approximate total court reporter LQA cost of
$246,500.  Next, the COLA rate for all court reporter locations in Germany is fifteen percent.
Post (Cost of Living) Allowance Percentage of Spendable Income, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http:/
/aoprals.state.gov/Web920/cola.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (rates effective Jan. 25, 2015).
The spendable income of a GS-9 in Wiesbaden is $30,600 (four overseas positions are for GS-
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for full-time court reporters is approximately $12,178,276.  Assuming
that court reporters spend roughly one-fifth of their time in court (which
is not part of post-trial),82 the Army spends approximately $9,742,621 on
the post-trial activities of court reporters.83
Fourth, trial counsels, defense counsels, and judges are post-trial
personnel to the extent that they devote a substantial amount of time to
reviewing trial transcripts and preparing errata during the pre-authentica-
tion stage of post-trial.84  After the court reporter transcribes the proceed-
ings and prepares the record of trial, the trial counsel, the defense
counsel, and each judge who presided over the proceedings must review
the entire record for errors or omissions.85  Sometimes, the attorneys and
judge must review the transcript multiple times before the judge authenti-
cates the record of trial.86  Because trial counsels, defense counsels, and
judges spend only a fraction of their time working on post-trial, a calcu-
lation of their share of post-trial costs cannot merely use their annual
wages.  Instead, to determine the cost to the Army of the time its judge
advocates devote to reviewing and authenticating records of trial, assume
that each judge and attorney reviews records of trial at a rate of one page
per minute.  Next, apply the Laffey Matrix to assign a value to each hour
9s) and is $33,400 for a GS-10. Annual Spendable Income by Salary and Family Size, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, http://aoprals.state.gov/Content/Documents/SpendableIncome.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2015) (rates effective Jan. 26, 2015).  Multiply the COLA rate of fifteen percent
by the spendable income rates to reach the annual COLA cost per court reporter.  The COLA
cost is $33,400 times fifteen percent equals $5,010 for the GS-10.  The COLA cost for the GS-
9s is $30,600 times fifteen percent times four personnel equals $18,360.  Add the COLA costs
for all five court reporters ($5,010 plus $18,360) to reach the Army’s total annual court re-
porter COLA cost of $23,370.  Add the Army’s total court reporter salary cost ($2,148,187)
plus the Army’s total court reporter LQA cost ($246,500) plus the Army’s total court reporter
COLA cost ($23,370) to reach the Army’s approximate total annual court reporter costs
($2,418,057).  However, note that this calculation underestimates what the Army spends on
pay and benefits for civilian court reporters because it does not include a variety of benefits
such as performance bonuses, various in-kind benefits, and future retirement benefits. See
ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL, supra note 59, at 17, 26 (discussing servicemember compensation,
which shares similarities with compensation of civilian employees of the Department of
Defense).
82 See SFC Abbott Interview, supra note 69; SSG Glober Interview, supra note 70.
83 If court reporters spend roughly one-fifth of their time in court (which is not part of
post-trial), reduce $12,178,276 by one-fifth to estimate the sum the Army spends on the post-
trial activities of court reporters ($9,742,621).
84 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a).
85 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a); Professional Experiences, supra note
27 (observing a requirement for trial defense counsel to review transcripts prior to authentica-
tion that is based in local and regional Trial Defense Service policy).
86 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a).
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of judge advocate labor.87  Thus, the Army’s estimated annual cost of
requiring three attorneys to review every record of trial is $2,767,905.88
Fourth, attorneys at the appellate level have post-trial duties that are
separate and distinct from their appellate litigation duties.  An attorney at
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) must read the entire
record of trial for every court-martial with a sentence of less than one
year confinement and no punitive discharge.89  Conversely, at least one
attorney at the defense appellate division and three judges on the service
court of criminal appeals must read the entire record of trial for all other
courts-martial.90  Actual appellate litigation at the court of criminal ap-
peals starts only if the defense appellate attorney or one of the three ap-
pellate judges alleges error.91  The Army’s estimated annual cost of
87 See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1983); Laffey
Matrix 2014–2015, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laf-
fey%20Matrix_2014-2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2015); History, LAFFEY MATRIX, http://
www.laffeymatrix.com/history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2015); Calculating Awards of Attor-
ney Fees, ECONOMISTS INCORPORATED, http://www.ei.com/vieweconink.php?id=269 (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2015) (describing the superiority of the Laffey Matrix versus other methods of
calculating attorneys fees).  The Laffey Matrix is a tool widely used by the courts to award
attorney fees. See Calculating Awards of Attorney Fees, supra note 87.  It is calculated annu-
ally by the U.S. Department of Justice. See Laffey Matrix 2014–2015, supra note 87.  This
Article applies the rate for attorneys with one-to-three years experience ($255) for trial coun-
sels because those positions are usually held by junior and mid-grade captains. Id.  This Arti-
cle applies the rate for attorneys with four-to-seven years experience ($300) for defense
counsel and appellate counsel because the Army generally assigns more senior captains to
those positions. Id.  Next, this Article applies the rate for attorneys with eleven-to-nineteen
years experience ($460) for judges. Id.; JAGC DIRECTORY, supra note 55; OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., U.S. ARMY, PUBLICATION 1-1, PERSONNEL POLICIES ¶¶ 8-4–8-5
(2014) (listing qualifications for Army trial and appellate judges).
88 818 courts-martial multiplied by the average length of a record of trial (200 pages)
equals 163,600 pages to review in fiscal year 2014. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015,
supra note 11.  Assuming a review rate of one page-per-minute, divide 163,600 pages by 60 to
estimate how many hours trial counsels spent reviewing records of trial in fiscal year 2014.
The result is 2,727 hours.  The calculation is the same for defense counsel and judges.  Next,
multiply 2,727 hours by the hourly billable rate from the Laffey Matrix ($255) to estimate the
annual cost having trial counsels review every record of trial ($695,385). See Laffey Matrix
2014–2015, supra note 87.  For defense counsel, multiply 2,727 hours by the hourly billable
rate from Laffey Matrix ($300) to estimate the annual cost having defense counsels review
every record of trial ($818,100). Id.  For judges, multiply 2,727 hours by the hourly billable
rate from Laffey Matrix ($460) to estimate the annual cost having judges review every record
of trial ($1,254,420). Id.  Add the totals for trial counsel ($695,385), defense counsel
($818,100), and judges ($1,254,420) to estimate the annual cost to the Army of having all
three types of attorneys review every record of trial ($2,767,905).
89 See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 64; MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1112.
90 UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 66; MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1203.  Regardless of
whether the defense appellate attorney alleges error, each judge on a three judge panel cur-
rently reads the entire record of trial for each case that meets the minimum sentence require-
ments. See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 66; U.S. Army Ct. Criminal Appeals Internal Rules of
Practice and Procedure (A.C.C.A. R.) 4(a).
91 See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 66; A.C.C.A. R. 15.
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mandatory review by a defense appellate attorney and three appellate
judges is $4,581,360.92
In summary, the Army annually spends approximately $3,244,356
on the post-trial efforts of chiefs of military justice, approximately
$4,929,137 on the post-trial efforts of paralegals, approximately
$9,742,621 on the post-trial efforts of court reporters, approximately
$2,767,905 by requiring three attorneys to review every record of trial
before authentication, and approximately $4,581,360 by requiring appel-
late attorneys and judges to review every record of trial again after the
convening authority’s initial action.  Thus, the estimated annual total cost
to the Army of the efforts its personnel devote to post-trial processing is
$25,265,379.
2. Contracts Related to Post-Trial
Further, the Army incurs additional post-trial costs above and be-
yond the salary and benefits of post-trial personnel.  The most concrete
of these additional costs occur when the Army contracts with outside
court reporters to transcribe records of trial.93  The Army must enter into
transcription contracts because the requirement to transcribe every court-
martial far exceeds the capacity of its military and federal civilian court
reporters.94  Two general court-martial convening authorities alone spent
$125,000 on transcription contracts in 2014.95  Given that there are fifty-
eight general court-martial convening authorities that are active in the
Army, transcription contracts likely add up to millions of dollars annu-
ally across the Army.96
92 See supra note 87 (explaining estimated value of attorney labor hours).  818 courts-
martial multiplied by the average length of a record of trial (200 pages) equals 163,600 pages
to review in fiscal year 2014. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11.  Assuming
a review rate of one page-per-minute, divide 163,600 pages by 60 to estimate how many hours
individual appellate attorneys and appellate judges spent reviewing records of trial in fiscal
year 2014.  The result is 2,727 hours.  Next, multiply 2,727 hours by the hourly billable rate
from Laffey Matrix ($300) to estimate the annual cost of having defense appellate attorneys
review every record of trial ($818,100). See Laffey Matrix 2014–2015, supra note 87.  For
appellate judges, multiply 2,727 hours by the hourly billable rate from Laffey Matrix ($460) to
estimate the annual cost having one judge review every record of trial ($1,254,420). Id.  Mul-
tiply by three because three appellate judges must review every record of trial.  3 x $1,254,420
= $3,763,260.  Add the totals for defense appellate attorney ($818,100) and appellate judges
($3,763,260) to estimate the annual cost to the Army of having both types of attorneys review
every record of trial ($4,581,360).
93 See E-mail from Warrant Officer Aseba Green, Legal Administrator, XVIII Airborne
Corps, U.S. Dep’t of Army, to author (Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter WO1 Green E-mail] (on file
with author); E-mail from Major Paul Carlson, Chief of Military Justice, U.S. Army Forces
Command, to author (Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter MAJ Carlson E-mail] (on file with author).
94 See supra note 93.
95 See supra note 93.
96 See supra note 93.  This Article assumes the Army’s contracting costs are $1 million
annually for purposes of calculating the military’s post-trial costs.
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3. The Convicted’s Pay and Benefits
Next, a servicemember convicted at court-martial continues to re-
ceive costly military benefits long after the trial’s conclusion (even if the
court-martial sentences the servicemember to a punitive discharge from
the military).97  These costs fall into three categories: deferment or
waiver of pay forfeitures, pay while in confinement, and non-pay
benefits.
First, the convicted’s punishment often includes forfeiture of pay or
reduction in grade (i.e., military rank).98  However, the convening au-
thority can defer or waive pay forfeitures or rank reduction so that the
military continues to pay full salary to the convicted servicemember or
his family as if the conviction never happened.99  With a few exceptions,
convening authorities tend to approve pay deferments or waivers in
nearly all cases where the convicted is married or has children.100  Ac-
cordingly, the military continues to pay full salary to most convicted ser-
vicemembers for an average of between two hundred to three hundred
and eighty days after sentencing.101  Deferment and waiver of pay for-
feitures cost the Army approximately $20,386,964 each year.102
97 See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 71(c); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11
(explaining that the average time from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals was 231 days in 2014); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11
(explaining that the average processing time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is 339 days). See generally Grimes, supra note 24 (case exceeding four years of post-
trial processing).
98 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101.
99 Id. Deferment is the convening authority’s power to postpone pay forfeitures or rank
reduction until the convening authority takes post-trial action. Id. Waiver is the convening
authority’s power to continue paying salary to the family of the accused for six months after he
takes post-trial action. Id. Waiver only applies to pay forfeitures that occur as a matter of law,
not pay forfeitures adjudged by the court-martial. Id.
100 See Professional Experiences, supra note 27 (observing the deferment and waiver
practices of many general court-martial convening authorities across more than eight years).
101 Approximately sixty-four percent of Soldiers are married or have children. OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. (MILITARY CMTY. & FAMILY POLICY), 2013
DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 118 (2014) [hereinafter 2013
DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY] .  Because deferments generally ter-
minate when the convening authority takes initial action on the court-martial results, the aver-
age length of pay deferments is two hundred days. See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101;
Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (providing data showing that the average time
between sentencing and convening authority initial action is 200 days).  Because convening
authorities can waive forfeitures for six months after initial action, the average length of pay
deferments combined with pay forfeitures is three hundred and eighty days. See MCM, supra
note 4, R.C.M. 1101; Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (providing data showing
that the average time between sentencing and convening authority initial action is 200 days).
102 Assume the average duration of deferments and waivers is three hundred eighty days.
See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101. See generally supra note 101.  Next, assume that half
of convicted servicemembers receive deferments and waivers.  Finally, use the pay of a ser-
vicemember at the grade of E-4 with six years of service to estimate the average pay a con-
victed servicemember collects through deferments and waivers.  While the pay grade and
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Second, many servicemembers continue to be paid while in confine-
ment, regardless of whether or not the convening authority approves
deferments or waivers of forfeitures.  Every servicemember confined by
a special court-martial will continue to be paid at least part of his pay and
all of his allowances while in confinement.103  This result occurs because
the maximum pay forfeiture that a special court-martial can adjudge is
only two-thirds of base pay.104  And regardless of the type of court-mar-
tial, any servicemember who receives a forfeiture of less than total for-
feitures remains eligible to receive all allowances (such as the basic
allowances for subsistence or housing).105  Given that the average basic
allowances for subsistence and housing add up to tens of thousands of
dollars each year per servicemember, the Army likely pays several mil-
length of service data for all convicted servicemembers is unavailable, the data for sexual
assault investigations suggests that the average pay grade of convicted servicemembers likely
falls around E-4 or E-5. See DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 93 (2014) (reporting that approximately half of completed
sexual assault investigations included subjects in the grades of E-1 to E-4, and half included
subjects in the grades of E-5 and above).  The annual salary is $29,419 for an E-4 with six
years of service. See MILITARY PAY CHART 2015, supra note 59.  The annual basic allowance
for subsistence for enlisted servicemembers is $4,415. See id.  The average annual basic al-
lowance for housing with dependents rate in the continental United States is $14,808 for a
specialist. Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://mili-
tarypay.defense.gov/Calculators/RMCCalculator.aspx (enter E-4 for the pay grade and leave
the location blank, but note that this underreports the current rate because it is a prior year
number) (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); see MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1003 (explaining that the
punishment of total forfeitures includes all allowances, such as the basic allowance for subsis-
tence and the basic allowance for housing).  $29,419 plus $14,808 plus $4,415 equals $48,642.
Three hundred eighty days is 1.04 of a year.  Thus, the estimated average cost of each defer-
ment and waiver is approximately $50,588 ($48,642 multiplied by 1.04).  Assuming that half
of all courts-martial involved deferments and waivers, multiply 403 courts-martial by $50,588
to estimate the Army’s cost of deferments and waivers that originate in a year’s worth of
courts-martial ($20,386,964). See E-mail from Homan Barzmehri, Management and Program
Analyst, Army Court of Criminal Appeals, to author (Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Barzmehri E-
mail, Jan. 23, 2015] (on file with author) (reporting that 805 cases went to the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals for review after reaching findings in 2014).  Note that this is a conservative
figure that may underestimate the annual costs of deferments and waivers of forfeitures.  First,
this estimate used the number of courts-martial convictions that qualify for review at the Army
Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) on the theory that those cases included higher sentences
and thus were very likely to include total forfeitures of pay and allowances.  The actual num-
ber of courts-martial that include forfeitures is likely higher because this estimate ignored all
courts-martial that did not qualify for review at ACCA.  Second, this estimate assumed a rate
of deferments or waivers that is probably too low.  The rate of deferments and waivers is likely
closer to sixty-four percent because that is the percentage of Soldiers who are married or have
children (and convening authorities approve a very high rate of the deferment or waiver re-
quests from servicemembers who have dependents). See 2013 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF THE
MILITARY COMMUNITY, supra note 101, at 118; Professional Experiences, supra note 27 (ob-
serving the deferment and waiver practices of many general court-martial convening authori-
ties across more than eight years).
103 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 201(f)(2), 1003.
104 See id.
105 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1003.
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lion dollars of pay and allowances annually to servicemembers who are
in confinement.106
Third, convicted servicemembers receive a variety of non-pay bene-
fits during the post-trial process.  When a court-martial sentences a ser-
vicemember to a punitive discharge, the discharge does not take effect
until after the convening authority takes initial action, the appellate
courts complete their mandatory reviews, and then a second general
court-martial convening authority takes final action.107  This process
takes an average of five hundred seventy days to complete,108 but can
last three or four years for more complex cases.109  During the years that
elapse between trial and final action, the convicted servicemembers re-
main in the military and thus continue to receive full military benefits.  In
many cases, the servicemember’s pay will stop because of a punishment
that includes pay forfeitures, the servicemember reaches the end of his
enlistment contract, or the servicemember’s commander places him in an
indefinite leave status.110  Yet regardless of the servicemember’s pay sta-
tus, the convicted servicemembers and their families remain entitled to
free healthcare, commissary and exchange services, and other programs
until the appellate courts finish all review.111  Providing these non-pay
benefits to convicted soldiers costs the Army an estimated $15,860,110
annually.112
106 This amount is in addition to the cost of deferments and waivers discussed in the
preceding paragraph.  While worth noting, this cost is a quirk of the military justice system
that is not directly related to post-trial processing.  As a result, this Article does not include
this category of costs in its calculation of the total costs of post-trial.
107 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1203, 1204.
108 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average time
from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was 231 days in
2014); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average processing
time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339 days).
109 See generally Grimes, supra note 24 (case exceeding four years of post-trial
processing).
110 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1203(e)(2) (explaining that the General Court-Mar-
tial Convening Authority (GCMCA) may order unexecuted portions of sentences executed
after ACCA affirms); MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1209 (providing that a conviction is not
final until all appellate options have been exhausted); Grogan, supra note 45, at 20.
111 See supra note 110.
112 See generally ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL, supra note 59.  Non-cash benefits account for
forty-nine percent of a servicemember’s total compensation. Id. at 17.  Because regular mili-
tary compensation (RMC) is the cash portion of a servicemember’s annual benefits, cash bene-
fits account for fifty-one percent of total compensation; since average RMC was $50,747 in
fiscal year 2010, the average total compensation for servicemembers in fiscal year 2010 was
$99,504 ($50,747 divided by fifty-one percent). See id. at 17, 26.  The average servicemember
received non-cash benefits costing $48,757 in fiscal year 2010 ($99,504 divided by forty-nine
percent). See id.  The non-cash benefits of most interest for post-trial are in-kind benefits such
as health care and commissary privileges (excluding family housing/barracks and education
because those benefits are less likely to be available to a servicemember awaiting final action
on a punitive discharge).  To find this amount per average servicemember, first total the costs
of health care compensation ($15.9 billion) and “other in-kind” compensation ($20.2 billion)
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Combining the costs of deferments or waivers and non-pay benefits
during the post-trial process, the convicted’s pay and benefits cost the
Army approximately $36,247,074 annually.113  Additionally, the con-
victed servicemember may be entitled to hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in back pay if the appellate process eventually overturns the punitive
discharge.114
4. Summary of Costs of the Current Post-Trial Regime
In total, the Army spends approximately $62,512,453 annually on
post-trial processing (excluding actual appellate litigation).115  However,
a full estimate of the costs that the post-trial process imposes on the mili-
tary must also account for the post-trial costs of the Navy, Marines, Air
Force, and Coast Guard.  Assuming each active component of the armed
services has similar post-trial processing costs that are proportionate to
its size,116 the U.S. military spends approximately $170 million annually
on post-trial processing.117
to reach $36.1 billion. See id.  This is 94.26% of total in-kind compensation ($36.1 billion
divided by $38 billion). See id.  Multiply 94.26% by 21% (total in-kind compensation’s per-
centage of total compensation) to find the post-trial-related category of in-kind compensation’s
share of total compensation (19.8%). See id.  Multiply $99,504 (servicemember average total
compensation) by 19.8% (the share of the post-trial-related in-kind category) to obtain
$19,702. See id.  Thus, in-kind benefits such as health care and commissary privileges (ex-
cluding family housing/barracks and education) cost the military $19,702 per average ser-
vicemember in fiscal year 2010.  To estimate the annual total cost of non-cash benefits
provided to servicemembers awaiting final action on their punitive discharges, multiply
$19,702 by the number of punitive discharges adjudged in 2014.  805 cases went to ACCA
after reaching findings in 2014. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 23, 2015, supra note 102.  All 805
cases likely included a punitive discharge, given that the trigger for ACCA review is either a
punitive discharge or confinement of one year (and conviction serious enough to warrant con-
finement for one year would almost always also warrant a punitive discharge, as well). See
MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201.  $19,702 x 805 = $15,860,110.
113 $20,386,964 plus $15,860,110 equals $36,247,074. See supra notes 102, 112 and ac-
companying text.  This figure does not include the pay and allowances a servicemember re-
ceives while in confinement separate from deferments and waivers. See supra notes 103–106
and accompanying text.
114 The yearly pay for staff sergeant with eight years of service is $61,859. See supra
note 80.  Thus, four years of back pay would amount to $247,436.
115 This number represents the sum of the calculations from the prior three sections of this
Article. See supra Part III.A.1–3.
116 UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 2; MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 101.  The UCMJ and the
Rules for Court-Martial are uniform across the branches of the U.S. military.  Assuming post-
trial costs are similar across the services is a well-supported assumption because the same laws
create the same general post-trial requirements for each service.
117 See Active Duty Military Strength by Service, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., https://
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj /dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) (depicting strength
as of Nov. 30, 2014).  There are 1,369,472 total active duty personnel in the U.S. military. See
id.  There are 503,651 active duty personnel in the Army. See id.  503,651 is 36.78 percent of
1,369,472.  Thus, divide the Army’s approximate total annual cost of post-trial processing
($62,512,453) by 36.78 percent to estimate the military’s total annual cost of post-trial
processing ($169,963,167).
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B. Putting the Costs of Post-Trial in Their Proper Context
Having estimated the annual cost of the military’s unique and re-
source-intensive post-trial process, a responsible steward of taxpayer re-
sources must ask: Is the costly system worth the benefits it provides for
the convicted, the commanders, and the United States as a whole?  To be
clear, this Article will never argue that a convicted servicemember’s
post-trial rights should bend merely to save money.  Rather, this Article
argues that efficiency should be a part of the broader discussion (but
never the whole discussion) about what changes could improve the mili-
tary’s post-trial system.
This section of the Article focuses on whether the unique military
post-trial system actually performs well.  To explore this question, this
section considers in turn: (1) the return on investment in the military
post-trial system when compared to civilian post-trial systems, (2) the
painful tradeoffs military commanders must make in order to sustain cur-
rent levels of spending on post-trial processing, and (3) a cost-benefit
analysis of the military post-trial system from the convicted’s
perspective.
1. The Military Post-Trial Process is Considerably More
Expensive than Its Civilian Counterparts
The military justice system is unique among American justice sys-
tems because it serves dual purposes: (1) enhancing the military’s
warfighting capabilities, and (2) accomplishing the traditional goals of a
justice system (i.e., protecting the rights of the accused, punishing and
deterring crime, etc.).118  Further, “the military is, by necessity, a special-
ized society apart from civilian society,” because the military’s “primary
business . . . [is] to fight or [be] ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise.”119  Given the unique nature of the military itself and the military
justice system as a whole, one should not demand that the military post-
trial system mirror its civilian counterparts.
Nonetheless, comparing military and civilian post-trial systems
helps us gauge how well the military post-trial system performs in rela-
tion to each of its dual purposes.  The military post-trial system annually
costs more than sixty-four times the entire federal appellate court system
(when adjusted for the size of each jurisdiction).120  The military post-
118 See CRIMINAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY,
CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, 2 PRE- AND POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE A-1 (2012), http://www.loc
.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Crim-Law-Deskbook-8-3-12_Vol-2.pdf.
119 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
120 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL BRANCH, FISCAL
YEAR 2015, at 52 (2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=
BUDGET&browsePath=Fiscal+Year+2015&searchPath=Fiscal+Year+2015&leafLevel
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trial system annually costs more than 4.7 times California’s entire appel-
late court system (when adjusted for the size of each jurisdiction).121
Further, these figures significantly underestimate the relative disparity
between military and civilian post-trial costs.122
While the cost disparity between military and civilian post-trial sys-
tems does not by itself prove the need for reform, it does provide several
insights.  First, there is a common misunderstanding among judge advo-
cates that the military’s post-trial system (in particular its transcription
Browse=false&isCollapsed=false&isOpen=true&packageid=BUDGET-2015-APP&ycord=
814.  The estimated fiscal year 2015 budget for the eleven U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal is
$614,000,000. Id. at 52.  In order to compare this budget with the costs of the military justice
system, the author performed the following calculations to convert both numbers to a per
capita basis.  At the time of writing, the population of the United States was 318,857,056.
USA Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2015).  In contrast, there are 1,369,472 total active duty personnel in the
U.S. military. Active Duty Military Strength by Service, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., https://
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) (depicting strength
as of Nov. 30, 2014).  Thus, the active duty military population is .43% the size of the U.S.
population.  Multiply the U.S. Courts of Appeal budget ($614,000,000) by .43% to obtain a
scaled budget ($2,640,200) that accounts for differences in the sizes of the jurisdictions.  The
military’s annual post-trial processing costs ($169,963,167) are 6,438 percent higher than the
scaled U.S. Courts of Appeal budget ($2,640,200).
121 CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2014–2015 ENACTED BUDGET SUMMARY 51–52 (2014), http://
www.ebudget.ca.gov/2014-15/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.  Cali-
fornia’s total 2014–15 fiscal year budget for its appellate courts is approximately $1 billion.
Id.  The budget includes all expenditures, including capital projects, personnel, facilities,
equipment, etc. Id.  In order to compare California’s budget with the costs of the military
justice system, the author performed the following calculations to convert the both numbers to
a per capita basis.  At the time of writing, California’s population was 38,715,000. CAL. DEP’T
OF FIN., NEW STATE POPULATION REPORT: CALIFORNIA GREW BY 358,000 RESIDENTS IN 2014
(2015), http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-1/documents/E-
1_2015PressRelease.pdf.  In contrast, there are 1,369,472 total active duty personnel in the
U.S. military. Active Duty Military Strength by Service, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., https://
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (depicting strength as of Nov. 30, 2014).  Thus,
the active duty military population is 3.54% the size of California’s population.  Multiply
California’s appellate court budget ($1,000,000,000) by 3.54% to obtain a scaled budget
($35,400,000) that accounts for differences in the sizes of the jurisdictions.  The military’s
annual post-trial processing costs ($169,963,167) are 476 percent higher than California’s
scaled appellate court budget ($35,700,000).
122 The comparisons in this paragraph significantly underestimate the military post-trial
system’s higher costs because this Article’s estimate of military post-trial costs excluded the
costs of facilities, equipment, and actual appellate litigation. See supra Part III.A.  In contrast,
the budget data for the U.S. Courts of Appeal and California’s appellate court budge includes
the costs of all personnel, facilities, and equipment for the entire appellate process. See OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL BRANCH, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 52
(2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=BUDGET&
browsePath=Fiscal+Year+2015&searchPath=Fiscal+Year+2015&leafLevelBrowse=false&is
Collapsed=false&isOpen=true&packageid=BUDGET-2015-APP&ycord=814; CAL. DEP’T OF
FIN., 2014–2015 ENACTED BUDGET SUMMARY 51–52 (2014), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/
2014-15/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.
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and authentication practices) is similar to civilian practice.123  The cost
disparity should shatter that misunderstanding.  Second, the cost dispar-
ity raises questions about the military post-trial system’s efficiency in
protecting the convicted’s rights.  In other words, does the military post-
trial system actually provide a convicted with protections that are sixty-
four times better than the federal system?  If not, then policymakers
should consider improving military post-trial procedures to increase effi-
ciency.  Third, the cost disparity conflicts with Congress’s stated intent
that the military justice system should be in line with civilian justice
systems.124  Finally, the cost disparity highlights the painful tradeoffs
that fiscally-constrained policymakers must make in order to pay for the
military post-trial system.125  To the extent that these tradeoffs under-
mine the military’s warfighting capability, unnecessary post-trial proce-
dures could also undermine a foundational principle of the military
justice system.126
2. Painful Tradeoffs: What the Military Must Forgo in Order to
Pay for Its Current Post-Trial Process
Because the military justice system exists in part to enhance the
military’s warfighting capabilities,127 whether the military’s post-trial
system is performing well depends in part on what capabilities warfight-
ers must forgo in order to maintain it.  In the modern era of shrinking
military budgets and increasing mission requirements, the decision to
continue one military program necessarily carries with it a decision to cut
other capabilities.128  The decision to spend approximately $170 million
annually on post-trial protections that far exceed those offered in civilian
post-trial systems must be viewed through the prism of budget cuts that
123 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 6 (providing excellent recommendations for reform of
the convening authority initial action, but incorrectly assuming that the pre-authentication
phase of post-trial “is on par with civilian criminal courts”). See also supra Part II; infra
Appendix B.
124 UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 36 (“[P]ost-trial procedures . . . for cases . . . triable in
courts-martial . . . may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts . . . .”).
125 See infra Part III.B.2.
126 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at A-1 (explaining that the military
justice system exists to enhance the nation’s warfighting capabilities as well as to accomplish
the traditional goals of a justice system).
127 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note
118, at A-1.
128 See generally Marshall, supra note 14 (discussing military budget cuts and the effects
of sequestration); infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (explaining the economic theory
of opportunity costs).
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are forcing the Army to cut 80,000 Soldiers and inactivate one-fourth of
its brigade combat teams.129
The theory of opportunity costs provides a useful analytical tool to
evaluate the impact of maintaining the military’s current post-trial pro-
cess.130  Opportunity cost is “the cost associated with opportunities that
are forgone by not putting the [organization’s] resources to their highest
value use.”131  For example, suppose a firm owns a building in prime
downtown real estate and uses that building as their headquarters.  How-
ever, the firm could sell the prime downtown real estate for $10 million
revenue and relocate to a less expensive location in the suburbs for $2
million in costs.  At first glance, the layperson may incorrectly think the
firm’s decision to remain downtown makes economic sense because re-
maining downtown appears to have zero costs (because they already own
the building) while the decision to relocate would incur expenses of $2
million.  However, the decision to remain at the downtown headquarters
is also a decision to forgo the $8 million profit the firm could achieve by
relocating.  In this example, the opportunity cost of the firm’s decision to
remain downtown is $8 million and must figure into the firm’s analysis
of how to best allocate their resources.132  The economically sound deci-
sion for the firm would be to relocate because the higher opportunity
costs of remaining downtown make relocation a more efficient use of its
resources.133  Policy analysts, economists, and business executives all in-
clude opportunity costs when comparing the costs and benefits of com-
peting courses of action.134
To apply the theory of opportunity costs to the military’s post-trial
process, consider what other capabilities the military could obtain if it
reduced its post-trial expenses and reallocated those resources to more
productive uses.135  In the most extreme scenario, the military could field
three additional infantry battalions by reforming its post-trial system to
match the federal appellate system.136  Alternatively, eliminating the re-
129 See Report: Army Accelerating Cuts, Reorganization, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 21,
2013, http://www.stripes.com/report-army-accelerating-cuts-reorganization-1.248253 (report-
ing that budget cuts are forcing the Army to cut 80,000 Soldiers); Roulo, supra note 17 (ex-
plaining that budget cuts are forcing the Army to reduce the number of brigade combat teams
from forty-five to thirty-three by 2017).
130 See DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRAC-
TICE 340–41 (3d ed. 1998).
131 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 206 (4th ed. 1997).
132 See id. at 206–07.
133 See id.
134 See WEIMER & VINING, supra note 130.
135 See id.
136 See generally ELEVENTH QUADRENNIAL, supra note 59.  The average servicemember
received cash and non-cash benefits costing $99,504 in fiscal year 2010. See id. at 17, 26.
Divide the military’s total annual post-trial cost ($169,963,167) by $99,504 to estimate the
number of infantry Soldiers the military forgoes each year to pay for its post-trial costs
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quirement for multiple attorneys to review every record of trial prior to
authentication could free approximately 8,181 annual labor hours137 that
could be more productively spent prosecuting additional sexual assault
cases, devoting more time to sexual assault victims, or providing legal
assistance services to servicemembers.138  Regarding paralegal strength,
reforming the military post-trial process to mirror the federal appellate
system would allow the Army to reassign one or two additional parale-
gals to each brigade combat team.139  In an example that directly benefits
servicemembers and promotes retention, merely eliminating automatic
appeals for guilty pleas would pay for approximately 3,289 children of
servicemembers to attend a top-tier college each year.140  The military
forgoes each of these additional capabilities by not reallocating resources
away from post-trial towards potentially more productive uses.
3. Post-Trial Imposes Additional Costs on the Convicted
Finally, whether the military’s post-trial system performs well de-
pends in part on the costs and benefits it creates for convicted ser-
vicemembers.  On one hand, convicted servicemembers benefit from the
potential opportunity to have convictions overturned or sentences re-
(1,708). See supra Part III.A.4.  A battalion contains between five hundred and six hundred
Soldiers. Operational Unit Diagrams, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/
unitsandcommands/oud/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).  Because this Article’s estimate of post-
trial costs excluded the costs of appellate litigation, eliminating approximately $170 million of
post-trial costs would leave intact the military’s ability to conduct post-trial that mirrors the
federal appellate system. See generally infra Appendix B (comparing military and civilian
post-trial systems).
137 See supra note 92.  As a whole, trial counsels, defense counsels, and military judges
each spend approximately 2,727 hours each year reviewing records of trial. See supra note 92.
2,727 hours multiplied by three groups equals 8,181 annual labor hours across the military.  By
way of further comparison, 8,181 hours per year is equivalent to hiring four additional judge
advocates.  52 weeks per year times 40 hours of work per week equals 2,080 hours.  8,181
divided by 2,080 equals 3.93 full time employees.
138 See generally THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012) (highlighting the
perception that the military fails to adequately prosecute sexual assaults); SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2014) (discussing military
sexual assault trends); Grogan, supra note 45, at 28 (linking commanders’ decreasing use of
courts-martial to the increasing complexity of post-trial).
139 See Roulo, supra note 17 (explaining that budget cuts are forcing the Army to reduce
the number of brigade combat teams from forty-five to thirty-three by 2017).  Meanwhile,
there are approximately fifty-eight post-trial paralegals in the Army alone. See supra text
accompanying notes 60–68.
140 The yearly cost of attending the University of Texas at Austin is $25,842. Cost of
Attendance, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://finaid.utexas.edu/costs.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2015) (including the costs of in-state tuition, room and board, and miscellaneous expenses for
two semesters).  Military post-trial costs approximately $169,963,167 annually. See supra Part
III.A.4.  More than half of the military’s appellate cases are guilty pleas. See Barzmehri E-
Mail, Jan. 23, 2015, supra note 102.  Half of $169,963,167 is $84,981,584.  $84,981,584 di-
vided by the annual cost of attending the University of Texas at Austin ($25,842) is 3,289.
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duced through the post-trial process.141  On the other hand, convicted
servicemembers suffer a variety of costs created by the uncertainty and
the inherently slow processing times that result from the military’s elabo-
rate post-trial procedures.  First, the current post-trial process unnecessa-
rily hampers the ability of convicted servicemembers to find civilian
employment.  Civilian employers are reluctant to hire servicemembers
who cannot produce a Defense Department Form 214 (Certificate of Dis-
charge or Release from Active Duty).142  However, convicted ser-
vicemembers sentenced to punitive discharges do not receive a Form 214
until after the appellate courts complete their mandatory review and re-
turn the case to a general court-martial convening authority for final ac-
tion.143  Because this process could take years,144 a convicted
servicemember faces substantial challenges beyond his conviction when
attempting to obtain employment.  Second, the Army Clemency and Pa-
role Board will not consider an inmate for parole until after the conven-
ing authority takes initial action.145  Because the convening authority
could take a year or more to complete initial action,146 the elaborate na-
ture of military post-trial regularly deprives parole opportunities to ser-
vicemembers who were sentenced to relatively short periods of
confinement.
Whether the costs that systemic post-trial delay imposes on con-
victed servicemembers are acceptable depends in large part on the
probability of receiving meaningful clemency or appellate relief.  Unfor-
tunately, meaningful relief is largely a mirage for most convicted ser-
vicemembers.  First, convening authorities rarely grant clemency.147
Second, Congress largely stripped commanders of their clemency author-
141 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1107, 1203. But see Marinello, supra note 5, at 196
(finding that convening authorities grant clemency in approximately two percent of cases).
142 See Professional Experiences, supra note 27.
143 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1203(e)(2) (explaining that the GCMCA orders un-
executed portions of sentences executed after ACCA affirms); MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M.
1209 (providing that a conviction is not final until all appellate options have been exhausted).
Even a convicted who waives appellate rights will regularly wait more than a year for final
action and a Form 214. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11.
144 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average time
from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was 231 days in
2014); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average processing
time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339 days). See generally Grimes,
supra note 24 (case exceeding four years of post-trial processing).
145 AR 15-130, supra note 5, ¶ 3-1.
146 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average time
from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was 231 days in
2014); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average processing
time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339 days).
147 See Marinello, supra note 5, at 196 (finding that convening authorities grant clemency
in approximately two percent of cases).
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ity.148  Third, the procedural focus of the military’s post-trial system
means that any relief granted by the appellate courts tends to be procedu-
ral rather than substantive.149  For example, the procedurally complex
requirements for staff judge advocate recommendations or promulgating
orders regularly cause legal error.150  However, the remedy for this error
is to return the case to the convening authority for a new initial action.151
This remedy merely adds additional delay to the process without granting
substantive relief to the convicted.  As another example, the Army Court
of Criminal Appeals on average issues its decisions 570 days after
trial.152  Accordingly, the court is generally unable to grant meaningful
relief to sentences of less than eighteen months confinement.
IV. THE RAISON D’ ˆETRE FOR THE CURRENT POST-TRIAL SYSTEM
NO LONGER EXISTS
Despite its relatively high cost and unique procedural requirements,
the military post-trial system could be justifiable if it were specifically
tailored to protect against abuses that are unique to the modern military.
However, the historical state of affairs that prompted lawmakers to create
the military’s unique post-trial system no longer exists.153  As a result,
there is room for modern military post-trial to move closer to the civilian
post-trial model without sacrificing the rights of convicted ser-
vicemembers.154  This is this Article’s third rationale for reforming the
military’s post-trial process.
Past Presidents and Congresses built the military’s unique post-trial
system to address then-existing problems within the military justice sys-
tem.155  Widespread abuses of the court-martial process occurred during
148 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong.
§ 1702 (2013).
149 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 1 (arguing that military post-trial consists of outdated
rules that create unnecessary procedural errors that require correction on appeal but create no
substantive benefit for the convicted).
150 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at V-21–V-37, V-60–V-61.
151 See id.
152 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average time
from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was 231 days in
2014); Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11 (explaining that the average processing
time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339 days).
153 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 10–17 (describing historical development of military
post-trial); John A. Hamner, The Rise and Fall of Post-Trial: Is It Time for the Legislature to
Give Us All Some Clemency?, ARMY LAWYER 1 (2007) (describing historical development of
military post-trial). See generally Marinello, supra note 5 (describing historical development
of convening authority clemency).
154 See supra Part II.
155 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 10–17 (describing historical development of military
post-trial); Hamner, supra note 153, at 1–2 (describing historical development of military post-
trial). See generally Marinello, supra note 5 (describing historical development of convening
authority clemency).
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the first half of the twentieth century.156  For example, the Houston riot
of 1917 resulted in the largest murder trial in U.S. history.157  Sixty-three
African-American Soldiers were tried at a single court-martial.158  Thir-
teen of them were hanged en masse immediately after announcement of
the sentence without providing time for a higher judicial or command
authority to review the sentence.159  Additionally, the U.S. military con-
vened over two million courts-martial during World War II (one court-
martial for every eight servicemembers).160  Over forty-five thousand
servicemembers were serving sentences of confinement as World War II
ended.161  Further, courts-martial of this era featured presiding officers
who were generally not attorneys, verdicts decided by juries of officers
that took guidance from their commanders, lacked defense attorneys (or
any attorneys for that matter), and allowed no meaningful appellate re-
view.162  Americans demanded reform as servicemembers returned from
the battlefields of World War II and shared their stories of “injustices
committed by Americans on other Americans in the name of military
necessity, good order, and discipline.”163
Lawmakers responded by dramatically reworking the military jus-
tice system over the following four decades.  Lawmakers codified a new
military justice system by creating the nation’s first Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950.164  The Military Justice Acts of 1968
and 1983 further reformed and civilianized the military justice system.165
Now, the modern military justice system features a professional and in-
dependent judiciary, licensed attorneys representing both parties, a
fiercely independent trial defense bar that is protected by statute from
command interference, an independent appellate court for each service,
and high-quality civilian oversight through the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces.166  Well-established law prohibits unlawful command in-
fluence over the court-martial process.167  Military trial practice now
closely mirrors federal civilian trial practice,168 just as the Military Rules
156 See supra note 155.
157 See Fred L. Borch III, The Largest Murder Trial in the History of the United States:
The Houston Riots Courts-Martial of 1917, ARMY LAWYER 1, 1–3 (2011).
158 Id.
159 See id. at 2.
160 Captain John T. Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Oper-
ation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1972).
161 Id. at 40–41.
162 See supra note 155.
163 Willis, supra note 160, at 39.
164 See supra note 155.
165 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 10–17.
166 See supra note 155.
167 UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 36; MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 104.
168 See UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 36 (“Pre-trial, trial, and post-trial procedures . . . for
cases . . . triable in courts-martial . . . may be prescribed by the President by regulations which
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of Evidence now closely mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence.169  This
professional system of military justice matured decades ago and is now
firmly entrenched.170
However, lawmakers have not yet updated the military’s post-trial
rules to reflect the seismic shifts of the past four decades.171  Despite
small changes along the margins, the military’s post-trial rules still retain
the general shape they took in the 1950s and 1960s when lawmakers
were responding to the deficiencies of a military justice system in which
trained attorneys were largely absent.172  For example, the general court-
martial convening authority became a focal point of the post-trial process
not just because of his command prerogative to maintain good order and
discipline in his formation through clemency, but also because he had an
important quasi-appellate review authority.173  With a courtroom staffed
with laypersons and an appellate court in its infancy, convening authority
review and post-trial reviews at the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral were vital protections for convicted servicemembers.174  However,
the times have changed and it is time for the rules to change with them.
V. PROPOSED REFORMS
This section suggests a menu of proposed reforms to the military
post-trial system.  Each proposed reform is compatible with the others,
but is separate and distinct.  Policymakers could implement any or all of
them to achieve varying degrees of increased efficiency.
Each proposed reform shares several characteristics.  Each has the
potential to benefit convicted servicemembers by reducing the time they
spend in post-trial limbo while continuing to provide procedural rights
that exceed civilian standards.  Each proposed reform is mindful of the
military justice system’s dual purposes of enhancing warfighting capabil-
ities while accomplishing the traditional roles of a justice system.175  Yet
none of them would restrict the rights of convicted servicemembers
merely to save money.
Additionally, four fundamental ideas lie at the heart of the reforms
this Article proposes.  The first fundamental idea is that the post-trial
shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts . . . .”).
169 MIL. R. EVID. 1102 (“Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to the
Military Rules of Evidence 18 months after the effective date of such amendments, unless
action to the contrary is taken by the President.”).
170 See Marinello, supra note 5, at 192–93.
171 See supra note 155.
172 See supra note 155.
173 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 15–16 (discussing the convening authority’s quasi-ap-
pellate review authority prior to 1983).
174 See supra note 155.
175 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at A-1.
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system should be built on the principle of opting in, rather than opting
out.  Currently, convicted servicemembers become automatically en-
rolled in the full range of costly post-trial procedures, regardless of
whether they want them or not.  They can opt out of some of these proce-
dures but not others.176  Unfortunately, opt-out systems for determining
resource distributions are inherently wasteful and lead to overconsump-
tion of scarce resources.177  Worse (from the perspectives of economic
theory and behavioral science), convicted servicemembers are entirely
shielded from the costs of operating the military’s expensive post-trial
system.178  In the language of economists, this is an example of the
“common property resources” market failure that also causes further
overconsumption of scarce resources.179  The opt-out structure of mili-
176 Compare MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1110 (explaining a convicted’s ability to waive
appellate review), with MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1105 (explaining transcription and
authentication processes that cannot be waived).
177 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 131, at 19–325, 609–80.  One way to concep-
tualize the field of microeconomics is that it describes how individuals decide how to best
allocate scarce resources. See Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 6, 6–11 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998).
See generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 131 (providing an overview of the field of
microeconomics).  Much of microeconomic analysis is based on the theory that (given certain
conditions) supply and demand will set the price and quantity of a particular good or service at
a level that is economically efficient (i.e., that maximizes the aggregate welfare of consumers
and producers taken together). See generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 131; WEIMER
& VINING, supra note 130 (applying microeconomic tools to public policy analysis).  Opt-out
systems for determining resource distributions lead to overconsumption by distorting the price
incentives that normally influence consumer demand. See generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 131, at 19–325, 609–80.  This disruption occurs because the act itself of opting out
requires time and effort, which in turn are scarce resources that weigh into an individual’s
economic decision-making process. See Becker, supra note 177, at 6–11.  The perverse result
is that a convicted servicemember may decide not to opt out of a post-trial service to which he
attaches no value at all, simply because the act of opting out would cost him more (in terms of
time and effort) than passively consuming the post-trial service. See generally PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 131, at 19–325, 609–80.
178 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 131, at 579–680 (discussing economic effi-
ciency, externalities, and market failures).
179 See id. at 669–72.  Some types of transactions exhibit distorted cost and pricing incen-
tives that prevent supply and demand from reaching equilibrium at a price that is economically
efficient (i.e., that maximizes the aggregate welfare of consumers and producers taken to-
gether). See generally id. at 296–301, 579–680.  These scenarios are called market failures
because the distortions cause consumers to overconsume (or underconsume) scarce resources.
See id. at 609–80.  “Common property resources” are a type of market failure that occurs
where consumers can freely use scarce resources without paying for them. See id. at 669–72.
Because individuals face no direct cost for consuming the resource, they will consume too
much of it. See id.  Eventually, this overconsumption will cause harmful costs to the broader
community. See id.  For example, consider a large lake to which an unlimited number of
fishermen have access.  Because the lake is a common property resource, the individual fisher-
men have no incentive to take into account how their fishing affects others.  This causes fisher-
men to overfish, which over time will ruin the fishing lake. See id.  Military post-trial and the
fishing example are similar because the pricing mechanism that would normally cause individ-
ual consumers to regulate their behavior is absent in both cases.  In other words, the design of
the military post-trial system includes a structural bias that promotes the overconsumption of
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tary post-trial, combined with the no fee environment within which con-
victed servicemembers decide whether or not to opt-out of post-trial
services, means that convicted servicemembers overconsume post-trial
services at a high rate.180
This overconsumption of post-trial resources directly harms two im-
portant groups.  First, the overconsumption harms military commanders,
military servicemembers, and ordinary Americans by diverting scarce
funding away from other military programs and warfighting capabili-
ties.181  Second, the overconsumption harms convicted servicemembers
by misallocating scarce post-trial resources away from the convicted ser-
vicemembers who would most benefit from them.182  Given scarce post-
trial resources, the decision of a convicted servicemember not to opt-out
of post-trial because there is no fee (even though he has no expectation
of relief and does not attach much value to the process) means that the
post-trial system must devote less time and fewer resources toward con-
sidering another convicted servicemember’s case (even if he has a legiti-
mate chance for relief and attaches high value to the post-trial
process).183
To address the problems inherent in no fee opt-out systems, the de-
fault position in each case should be minimal post-trial procedure with
the opportunity to opt-in for more.184  For example, servicemembers who
feel wronged should be empowered to ask for relief.  An opt-in system of
post-trial distributes scarce resources where they will be most valued and
conserves post-trial resources by directing them away from activities
where the post-trial consumers value them less.185  The reforms proposed
in this Article attempt to move military post-trial toward an opt-in system
that more efficiently allocates scarce government resources while pre-
serving a high level of post-trial protections.
The second fundamental idea underpinning this Article’s proposed
reforms is the importance of providing increased discretion to the various
post-trial actors.  Decentralization of control makes sense because the
post-trial resources. See id.  But instead of merely causing poor fishing, the overconsumption
of military post-trial resources causes budgetary effects which have national security implica-
tions. See supra Part III.B.2.
180 See generally supra notes 177–79.
181 In the modern era of shrinking military budgets and increasing mission requirements,
the decision to continue one military program necessarily carries with it a decision to cut other
capabilities.  See supra Part III.B.2.
182 Given finite and relatively inflexible staffing levels of appellate defense counsel, ap-
pellate judges, and reviewing attorneys at each service’s Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, the volume of post-trial cases is inversely proportional to the amount of time and attention
each post-trial case receives. See JAGC DIRECTORY, supra note 55; supra Part III.B.2.
183 See supra note 182.
184 This would alleviate the overconsumption bias inherent in opt-out government pro-
grams. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
185 See generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 131, at 609–80.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP202.txt unknown Seq: 34 20-APR-16 11:48
368 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:335
post-trial actors (trial attorneys, trial judges, convening authorities, ap-
pellate attorneys, and each service’s Judge Advocate General) are in the
best position to know where their efforts would most effectively benefit
their clients or their commands.  Additionally, decentralization of control
should appeal to military commanders and servicemembers alike because
it is at the heart of the American way of doing battle and exercising
military command.186
Third, each proposed reform applies the theory that people make the
best and most efficient decisions when they are personally invested in the
decision-making process and reap both the rewards and the costs of their
decisions.187  A servicemember who believes he was wronged will be
highly motivated to ask for relief from the service appellate court or his
Judge Advocate General.  If a servicemember is not motivated to ask for
relief, then the government should not be motivated to throw resources at
pursuing rights the servicemember chooses not to exercise.
The fourth fundamental idea is that none of the proposed reforms
would eliminate a currently existing post-trial right of convicted ser-
vicemembers.188  These proposed reforms are low-hanging fruit in the
sense that they increase efficiency without upsetting the scales of justice.
Further, these reforms arguably benefit all convicted servicemembers to
the extent that they improve post-trial processing times and improve the
quality of post-trial reviews (by enabling reviewing attorneys and appel-
late judges to focus their efforts where they would be most likely to iden-
tify and correct legal errors).
A. Ease the Requirements for Attorneys to Review Transcripts Prior
to Authentication
This Article’s first proposed reform would simplify the process for
authenticating court-martial transcripts.  Currently, the military trial
judge authenticates every court-martial transcript after it is reviewed by
the court reporter, trial counsel, defense counsel, and each trial judge
186 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP
(2012) (discussing Army leadership theory).
187 This is a core tenet of the field of microeconomics. See generally PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 131.
188 This is the first of three criteria for post-trial reform elucidated by Navy Captain David
Grogan. See Grogan, supra note 45, at 17.  The reforms proposed in this Article also satisfy
Grogan’s remaining two criteria.  Because none of the proposed reforms would restrict the
convening authority’s clemency power, they clearly satisfy Captain Grogan’s second criteria
that commanders would not perceive these proposed reforms as “compromising the meaning-
ful exercise of the [c]ommander’s lawful prerogative over good order and discipline within his
or her command.” See Grogan, supra note 45, at 17.  Additionally, the proposed reforms
satisfy Captain Grogan’s third criteria that the “resulting system must work equally well in
both peacetime and war” because each of the reforms would reduce the resource burden asso-
ciated with military post-trial. See Grogan, supra note 45, at 17.
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who presided over a portion of the proceedings.189  This redundant pro-
cess should be simplified to eliminate all mandatory attorney reviews and
require the court reporter to authenticate the transcript.  Importantly, this
proposed reform would bring the military in line with the nearly univer-
sal practice across federal and state jurisdictions.190
This reform would produce clear benefits.  First, it would save ap-
proximately $7.5 million and shave approximately 7,414 hours off the
post-trial process annually.191  Second, this reform would not eliminate
any rights of the convicted given that the multiple attorneys who cur-
rently proofread the trial transcript have no authority to grant clemency
or appellate relief.192  Third, the military’s current authentication practice
does not appear to be based on any unique characteristics of the modern
military.193  Given that civilian court reporters successfully authenticate
transcripts in nearly all civilian jurisdictions, the primary justification for
requiring multiple attorney reviews in the military seems to be an as-
sumption that military court reporters are too incompetent to produce an
accurate record.194  Even if that assumption were true (it is not), the more
appropriate response would be to treat the disease itself by reevaluating
training and standards within the court-reporter system.195  Fourth, this
reform would not prohibit the prosecution, defense, or military judge
from reviewing the transcript.  Rather, it would allow the various actors
within the military justice system the discretion to reallocate their re-
sources where they would be most productive.  For example, if a trial
counsel knows that a particular portion of the trial was crucial for an
expected appeal, the trial counsel could review only that section and then
move on to other endeavors that would have more impact for her com-
189 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a); Professional Experiences, supra note
27 (observing a requirement for trial defense counsel to review transcripts prior to authentica-
tion that is based in local and regional Trial Defense Service policy).
190 See supra Part II; infra Appendix B.
191 Divide the Army’s total annual cost of three attorney reviews ($2,767,905) by 36.78
percent to estimate the military’s total annual cost of three judge reviews ($7,525,571). See
supra notes 92, 117.  Divide the Army’s total annual time spent conducting three attorney
reviews (2,727 hours) by 36.78 percent to estimate the military’s total annual time spent con-
ducting three attorney reviews (7,414 hours). See supra notes 92, 117.
192 See U.S. ARMY TRIAL JUDICIARY, RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE ARMY COURTS-MAR-
TIAL 28 (2013).
193 See supra Part IV.
194 See supra Part II; infra Appendix B (demonstrating that court reporters authenticate
transcripts in nearly all civilian jurisdictions).
195 Current rules already allow for a record of trial to be corrected if later found to be
deficient. See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1104(d).  Additionally, the senior trainer of Army
court reporters is already testing new training procedures and standards to improve court re-
porter performance. See SSG Glober Interview, supra note 70.
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mand.  Finally, this reform is attractive because no action would be
needed from Congress.196
B. Eliminate Promulgating Orders
Under the current rules, the government publishes the results of a
court-martial two separate times, using two separate documents.  Imme-
diately upon the conclusion of trial, the trial counsel (i.e., the prosecuting
attorney) creates a report of result of trial (RROT) that summarizes the
court-martial’s findings as to guilt and sentence.197  The trial counsel
provides the RROT to the convicted servicemember’s immediate com-
mander, the court-martial convening authority, and confinement
center.198  The RROT serves as the primary record of the court-martial’s
results for the first several months of the post-trial process and continues
to play a role throughout the post-trial process.199  Later in the post-trial
process, the convening authority (a senior military commander) must ap-
prove or disapprove the court-martial’s findings and sentence through a
procedure called initial action.200  The convening authority’s initial ac-
tion is published through a promulgating order.201  The promulgating or-
der serves as the official public record of the court-martial’s findings and
sentence.202  However, the promulgating order duplicates information al-
ready contained in the RROT while displaying it in a laboriously differ-
ent format.203  Unfortunately, the promulgating order is a frequent source
of appellate litigation and legal error.204
The military should eliminate the promulgating order.  The RROT
would serve admirably as the public record of court-martial findings and
sentences (particularly if it were signed by the military trial judge or the
jurisdiction’s chief of military justice).  If the convening authority later
196 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1104; U.S. ARMY TRIAL JUDICIARY, RULES OF
PRACTICE BEFORE ARMY COURTS-MARTIAL 28 (2013).
197 AR 27-10, supra note 40, ¶ 5-30.
198 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1101(a).
199 For example, the convening authority must consider the RROT when taking initial
action.  MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1107(b)(3)(A)(i).
200 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1107.  The convening authority may approve the findings
and sentence in whole or in part, but it may not increase the punishment or overturn findings of
not guilty. Id.
201 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1114.
202 Id.
203 Compare MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1114 (requiring the contents of a promulgating
order to include the type of court-martial, the command which convened it, the charges and
specifications, the accused’s pleas, the findings for each charge and specification, the sentence,
and the action of the convening authority) with U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DD FORM 2707-1, REPORT
OF RESULT OF TRIAL (2013) (requiring the same information, minus the convening authority
initial action).
204 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at V-21–V-37, V-60–V-61.
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disapproves portions of the findings or sentence, then the changes could
be easily published through an amended copy of the RROT.
This reform would provide wide-ranging benefits.  First, it would
generate potentially substantial indirect cost savings by reducing appel-
late litigation.205  Second, it would modestly reduce the military’s direct
post-trial costs by reducing the number of different documents prosecu-
tors must currently create.  Third, it would modestly reduce post-trial
processing times.  These benefits come at no cost to the convicted, given
that the promulgating order itself does not affect his post-trial rights.
C. Create Two Avenues for Automatic Appellate Review
This Article’s third proposed reform would increase the efficiency
of the military’s system of automatic appeals.  Under the current rules,
all courts-martial that result in a punitive discharge or confinement of
one year receive automatic appellate review.206  After reviewing a case,
the defense appellate counsel either files an “assignment of error” (i.e., a
brief alleging specific legal errors) or submits the case for appeal on the
merits (i.e., without a brief identifying specific legal errors).207  Regard-
less of whether the convicted or his defense appellate counsel allege a
specific legal error, each member of a panel of three appellate judges
examines the entire transcript and record of trial in search of as-yet-un-
identified potential error.208  The court may decide to hear oral argu-
ments regardless of whether or not the defense appellate attorney alleged
legal error.209  The service courts of criminal appeals decide all cases in
either a panel of three or en banc, regardless of whether the defense ap-
pellate counsel alleges legal error.210
The military’s system of automatic appeals should be reformed to
create two avenues of automatic appellate review.  The standard for trig-
gering automatic appellate review would remain the same (sentences that
result in a punitive discharge or confinement of one year).  The only
change would be in the role of the appellate judges.  The first avenue of
automatic appellate review would remain the same.  If the appellate de-
fense counsel alleges a specific legal error, then the current process
would continue to apply.  That is, the case would continue to be re-
viewed by a three judge panel at the service court of criminal appeals.
The second avenue of automatic appeal would govern only those cases in
which the defense appellate counsel is unable to allege specific legal er-
205 See id.
206 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201.
207 See A.C.C.A. R. 3, 15(a)–15.2.
208 See A.C.C.A. R. 4(a).
209 See A.C.C.A. R. 16.
210 See A.C.C.A. R. 4.
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ror.  If the appellate defense counsel does not allege a specific legal er-
ror, then only one judge at the service court of criminal appeals would
conduct the automatic appellate review.  If the single judge finds no er-
ror, he would affirm the case.  If the single judge identifies potential
legal error, he would refer the case to the normal three judge panel.  In
effect, the second avenue of automatic appeal would use a one judge
panel to screen out cases that do not need to be reviewed by a three judge
panel.
This reform would not eliminate any post-trial rights of the con-
victed because an appellate judge (and a defense appellate attorney)
would still review every qualifying case. Instead, it merely focuses judi-
cial resources on the cases that are most likely to benefit from judicial
review.  If a trial defense counsel and an appellate defense counsel are
both unable to identify any specific legal errors in a case, then it logically
follows that there is a low likelihood that there is actually legal error in
the case.  And if there is a low likelihood that the case has legal error,
then having three appellate judges redundantly review it is an inefficient
use of scarce judicial resources.  A more efficient use of judicial re-
sources would be to focus the appellate court’s scarce time on two areas
where there is a higher return: (1) reviewing cases where the defense
appellate attorney has actually alleged legal error, and (2) reducing ap-
pellate processing times by reviewing a higher volume of cases.
Further, the proposed reform would provide significant benefits to
all stakeholders in the post-trial system.  First, reducing the amount of
time that appellate judges spend reading transcripts would directly save
the military up to approximately $6.8 million annually.211 Second, it
would reduce processing times at the service courts of criminal appeals
by up to two-thirds by freeing up approximately 4,942 hours of appellate
judge labor each year.212  In other words, the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals (ACCA) currently takes an average of 339 days to review a
case.213  This reform could reduce ACCA’s processing time to 113
211 See supra note 92.  Divide the Army’s estimated total annual cost of mandatory three
appellate judge reviews ($3,763,260) by 36.78 percent to estimate the military’s total annual
cost of three judge reviews ($10,231,811). See supra note 117.  Divide $10,231,811 by three
to estimate the military’s total annual cost of each judge’s transcript reviews ($3,410,604).  If
the proposed reform leads to only one judge reviewing most cases at the service courts of
criminal appeals, then the military’s annual cost savings would be approximately $6,821,208.
212 Divide the Army’s total annual time spent conducting three appellate judge reviews
(2,727 hours) by 36.78 percent to estimate the military’s total annual time spent conducting
three judge reviews (7,414 hours). See supra notes 92, 117.  Divide 7,414 hours by three to
estimate the military’s annual labor hours associated with having one judge review every tran-
script at the service courts of criminal appeals (2,471 hours).  If the proposed reform leads to
only one judge reviewing most cases at the service courts of criminal appeals, then the military
would save approximately 4,942 judicial labor hours each year (2,471 x 2 = 4,942).
213 See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11 (providing average processing
times for the Army Court of Criminal Appeals).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP202.txt unknown Seq: 39 20-APR-16 11:48
2015] TAMING THE MILITARY’S POST-TRIAL LEVIATHAN 373
days.214  Third, reducing processing times at the service courts of crimi-
nal appeals would further reduce the military’s post-trial expenses by
creating second-order effects.  For example, it would reduce the cost of
non-pay benefits the military provides to convicted servicemembers dur-
ing post-trial.215  Fourth, reducing processing times at the service courts
of criminal appeals would benefit convicted servicemembers by reducing
the costs they suffer due to the systemic post-trial delays (such as em-
ployment difficulties associated with being in post-trial limbo).216  Fifth,
the reform would continue to provide servicemembers with appellate
rights that are on par with death penalty cases in civilian post-trial
systems.217
D. Adopt an Opt-In Procedure for Review at the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OTJAG)
Under current rules, an attorney at OTJAG must review all courts-
martial that result in conviction but do not trigger automatic review by
the service courts of criminal appeals.218  Further, an attorney must re-
view all courts-martial in which the convicted has waived appellate re-
view.219  These reviews occur automatically, regardless of whether or not
the convicted has expressed any interest in having his case reviewed.220
Further, they generally occur without any input from the convicted or his
defense attorney.221
The military’s system of automatic post-trial review for these cases
should change to an opt-in system.  Under an opt-in system, an attorney
at OTJAG would be required to review a conviction only if the convicted
requests review and alleges specific legal errors.  The attorney at OTJAG
would be required to review only the errors alleged by the convicted.
Attorneys at OTJAG would continue to have discretion to review cases
or issues beyond what convicted servicemembers request.
This proposed reform would reduce post-trial costs without elimi-
nating post-trial rights of convicted servicemembers.  First, the reform
214 The current average appellate review time at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is
339 days. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 27, 2015, supra note 11.  To determine how the average
processing time would change if the court became three times more efficient, divide 339 by
three.
215 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the costs of providing free healthcare, commissary
and exchange benefits, and other programs to convicted servicemembers and their families
during the post-trial process).
216 See supra Part III.B.3.
217 See supra Part II; infra Appendix B.  No civilian jurisdiction requires three appellate
judges to automatically review every conviction. See infra Appendix B.
218 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201.
219 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1112.
220 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1112, 1201.
221 See id.
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would reduce the caseload of attorneys at OTJAG and allow them to
focus on their core mission of developing criminal law policy for the
military services.  Second, it would increase a convicted ser-
vicemember’s control over the post-trial process by encouraging him to
focus OTJAG’s attention on the issues that matter to him.  Third, it
would increase the quality of the review process.  The trial defense attor-
ney is well-positioned to communicate the contentious legal issues from
the case because he argued them the first time.  The convicted is also
well-positioned to communicate the ways in which he believes he was
wronged by law enforcement or the military justice system.  Requiring
the convicted to sharpen the issues for the OTJAG attorney means the
most important issues will not be lost in the noise as the OTJAG attorney
slogs through thousands of pages of dry court-martial transcripts.222  Fi-
nally, this reform would not eliminate a servicemember’s right to request
relief from the Judge Advocate General.  Instead, it would merely shift
the onus to the convicted.  If convicted servicemembers are not moti-
vated to request relief, then it is difficult to argue they attached any value
to this right in the first place.
E. Adopt an Opt-In System of Appellate Review for Guilty Pleas
Under current rules, the military’s system of automatic appellate re-
view does not distinguish between pleas of guilty or not guilty.223  Even
if the convicted plead guilty, every court-martial conviction that results
in a punitive discharge or confinement of one year must be automatically
reviewed by a three judge panel at the service courts of criminal ap-
peals.224  This practice is entirely unique to the military post-trial system.
No civilian post-trial system provides automatic appellate review for
guilty pleas.225  Instead, many civilian jurisdictions limit appellate rights
after guilty pleas.226
The military should adopt an opt-in system for appellate review of
guilty pleas that more closely mirrors civilian post-trial practice.  Under
222 Transcripts for contested courts-martial are generally one thousand pages or longer.
See United States v. Bozicevich (3d Infantry Div., Fort Stewart Aug. 10, 2011) (14,200 page
record of trial); United States v. Lorance (82d Airborne Div., Fort Bragg Aug. 1, 2013) (1,000
page record of trial for two-and-a-half day trial).
223 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1103, 1201, 1203.
224 UCMJ, supra note 8, art. 66 (requiring three judge panels to hear cases at the service
courts of criminal appeals); MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 1201 (providing for automatic appel-
late review of sentences including a punitive discharge).
225 See infra Appendix B.
226 At least ten states restrict the convicted’s ability to appeal after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2; CAL. R. CT. 8.304; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(2); ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 605; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3602(a) (2014); MICH. CT. R. 6.425(F); OR. REV.
STAT. § 138.050 (2014); S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(d)(1)(B)(iv); TENN. R. APP. P. 3; TENN. R.
CRIM. P. 37; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2.
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this reform, the service courts of criminal appeals would only review a
guilty plea court-martial if the convicted servicemember requests appeal
and alleges specific legal errors.227  The service courts of criminal ap-
peals would limit their review to the specific legal errors raised by the
convicted or his defense appellate attorney.
The benefits of this reform would be profound.  First, moving to an
opt-in system of appellate review for guilty pleas would save approxi-
mately $85 million annually.228  By way of comparison, this cost savings
is equivalent to the cost of fielding one-and-a-half infantry battalions.229
Second, this reform would reduce processing times at the service courts
of criminal appeals by more than fifty percent.230  This dramatic reduc-
tion in appellate processing times would be possible because mandatory
reviews of guilty pleas make up more than half of the caseload at the
service courts of criminal appeals.231  Third, these reductions in appellate
processing times would further reduce the military’s post-trial expenses
by creating valuable second-order effects.  For example, it would reduce
the cost of non-pay benefits the military provides to convicted ser-
vicemembers during post-trial.232  Fourth, reducing processing times
would benefit convicted servicemembers who plead not guilty.  For ex-
ample, faster appellate processing would reduce the costs they suffer due
227 Because automatic appellate review would no longer apply to all guilty pleas, court
reporters would only transcribe the portions of the trial that are necessary to resolve the spe-
cific issues that are raised on appeal.  The government would continue to produce (at govern-
ment expense) any transcript that a convicted servicemember needs for his appeal.  The change
is that the court reporter would only transcribe those portions of the court-martial that the
defense appellate attorney identifies as necessary for the issues on appeal.  For example, if the
issue on appeal is the judge’s denial of a defense request to admit evidence under Military
Rule of Evidence 412, the defense attorney would request transcription of the motion hearing
and the trial testimony of only the relevant witnesses.  The government appellate attorney or
the court could order additional portions of the record transcribed if necessary.  Additionally,
the parties could forgo the need for a transcript entirely if the appeal involves a pure issue of
law or if the parties stipulate to the facts.  The record of trial would continue to include the
video or audio recordings of the entire court-martial, as well as the trial documents (written
motions, written decisions by the trial judge, etc.).  The record of trial, the opportunity to listen
to key portions of the video or audio recordings, and consultation with the trial defense attor-
ney would provide the appellate defense counsel all of the tools he would require in order to
identify the portions of the trial that need to be transcribed for an appeal.  This reform would
bring the military post-trial system in line with the transcription practices of every other juris-
diction in the United States. See infra Appendix B.
228 See supra Part III.A.4.  More than half of the military’s appellate cases are guilty
pleas. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 23, 2015, supra note 102.  Half of $169,963,167 is
$84,981,584.
229 See supra note 136.
230 ACCA reviewed 818 cases in 2014.  Four hundred twenty-seven cases were guilty
pleas and 101 were mixed pleas. See Barzmehri E-mail, Jan. 22, 2015, supra note 11.
231 Id.
232 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the costs of providing free healthcare, commissary
and exchange benefits, and other programs to convicted servicemembers and their families
during the post-trial process).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP202.txt unknown Seq: 42 20-APR-16 11:48
376 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:335
to systemic post-trial delays (such as employment difficulties associated
with being in post-trial limbo).233
While this reform creates exceptional opportunities to increase post-
trial efficiency, the justice-based arguments for this reform are also
strong.  First, the strongest argument in favor of automatic appellate re-
view of all convictions is based on the military’s low threshold for panel
(i.e., jury) convictions.  In order to convict at trial, only two-thirds of a
military panel must agree on guilt.234  Given the low threshold for con-
viction in the military, automatic appellate review is an important protec-
tion for servicemembers who were convicted by panels.  Yet this
argument only applies to contested panel trials.  The voting procedures of
a contested panel play no role in a guilty plea to a judge.
Second, a servicemember who has admitted guilt in open court and
survived the military’s uniquely rigorous providency inquiry is in a weak
position to claim that he was wrongfully convicted.235  Universal access
to professional defense counsel, the fierce independence and statutory
protections of the military’s trial defense services, and the detailed rights
advisements and providency inquiry that the military trial judge must
conduct before accepting a guilty plea make it unlikely that a convicted
servicemember could plead guilty in the modern military justice system
unless he fully understood what he was doing and felt that it was his best
strategic option.236  Further, the convicted would continue to have the
option to file an appeal if there is evidence of ineffective assistance of
counsel, unlawful command influence, or other procedural errors at the
guilty plea.  The difference is that the appellate defense attorney would
have to allege the specific legal errors (and have a good faith basis to do
233 See supra Part III.B.3.
234 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 921.
235 See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 910.
236 See id.; U.S. ARMY TRIAL DEF. SERV., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (2009)
(highlighting the organizational independence of the Trial Defense Service and the duties of
trial defense counsel); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK ¶¶ 2-1 to 2-2-8 (2014) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-9] (requiring the accused to
answer a rigorous inquiry into his understanding of the effects of pleading guilty and the
details of the offenses to which the accused is admitting guilt).  Military guilty pleas require
several hours at a minimum complete, and sometimes require a full day in court. See Profes-
sional Experiences, supra note 27 (prosecuting and defending guilty pleas in both military and
civilian courts across approximately ten years).  The long duration of military guilty pleas
illustrates the rigor of the safeguards in place to prevent innocent servicemembers from
wrongly pleading guilty.  Before accepting a guilty plea, the military trial judge must provide
the accused with a detailed rights advisement. See DA PAM. 27-9, supra note 236, ¶¶ 2-1 to 2-
2-8.  Further, the military trial judge must conduct a providency inquiry in which he thor-
oughly questions the accused to ensure that the accused understands the effects of pleading
guilty and can explain in detail the facts of the crimes he committed. See id.
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it) in order to trigger an appeal, rather than merely submit a case “on the
merits” without alleging specific legal errors.237
Although well-justified, this reform would be controversial because
it would substantially narrow an existing post-trial right of convicted ser-
vicemembers.238  However, this reform would not eliminate the right of
convicted servicemembers to appeal their guilty pleas.  Instead, it would
merely focus the scope of potential review and shift the onus to the con-
victed to articulate legal error.  In the end, this reform’s substantial cost
savings, increases in judicial efficiency, justice-based rationale, and the
fact that this protection does not exist in civilian jurisdictions all weigh
strongly in favor of adopting this reform.239
CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to broaden the discussion of how to improve
the military’s post-trial system.  To that end, this Article reported the
results of two pioneering research studies.  This was the first study to
methodically compare the military’s post-trial process against civilian
post-trial practices in all fifty states and the federal courts.  Until now,
there has been a widespread misperception among practitioners and pol-
icy-makers that both systems are constructed from the same building
materials, but with additional protections provided to servicemembers.240
Instead, this Article demonstrates that the most resource-intensive as-
pects of military post-trial have no civilian corollary.241  Additionally,
this was the first-ever study to calculate the actual costs of the military’s
post-trial process.242  Until now, policymakers had no way to use the
relative costs of the military and civilian post-trial systems to analyze the
efficiency of the military post-trial system.
237 Currently, defense appellate counsels regularly submit cases for appellate review with-
out alleging specific errors or requesting specific relief.  See A.C.C.A. R. 15.2.
238 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 17–28 (arguing that the defense bar would object to
reforms which eliminate a substantive right of the accused).
239 See supra Part II & III; infra Appendix B.
240 See Grogan, supra note 45, at 6 (providing excellent recommendations for reform of
the convening authority initial action, but incorrectly assuming that the pre-authentication
phase of post-trial is “on par with civilian criminal courts”).  Actually, the pre-authentication
phase of military post-trial has no equivalent across all fifty states and the federal courts. See
supra Part II.  Additionally, the pre-authentication phase of military post-trial accounts for a
large proportion of the overall costs and processing times while providing little benefit to
convicted servicemembers. See supra Part III.
241 See supra Parts III & IV.
242 Other commentators who have considered post-trial reform have approached the topic
from other angles. See generally Grogan, supra note 45 (considering post-trial reforms
through the lens of historical and logical analysis); Hamner, supra note 153, at 17–18 (consid-
ering whether the convening authority should continue to play a role in the post-trial process in
light of the judiciary’s trend of creating additional post-trial protections for the convicted).
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Using this new data as its background, this Article then set out to
explore whether the military post-trial system is performing efficiently.
This exploration began by acknowledging two principles that would
guide it.  First, a convicted servicemember’s post-trial rights should not
bend merely to save money.  Second, the military justice system is
unique among American justice systems in part because it serves dual
purposes: (1) enhancing the military’s warfighting capabilities, and (2)
accomplishing the traditional goals of a justice system (protecting the
rights of the accused, punishing and deterring crime, etc.).243  Given the
unique nature of the military itself and the military justice system as a
whole, one should not demand that the military post-trial system be just
like its civilian counterparts.
To gauge the efficiency of the military’s post-trial process, the Arti-
cle examined three areas.  First, the military’s post-trial system is signifi-
cantly more expensive than its civilian counterparts.  Given the unique
nature of military justice, significant cost disparity is expected.  Yet the
large size of the cost disparity indicates there is room for reforms to cut
wasteful practices.  Second, because the military justice system exists in
part to enhance the military’s warfighting capabilities,244 whether the
military’s post-trial system is performing well depends in part on what
capabilities warfighters must forgo in order to maintain it.  Given the
modern era of shrinking military budgets and increasing mission require-
ments, the military’s post-trial system’s approximately $170 million an-
nual cost requires the military to forgo significant warfighting
capabilities.  This result suggests that the military post-trial system does
not perform well in terms of enhancing the military’s warfighting capa-
bilities.245  Third, the military’s elaborate post-trial system creates both
costs and benefits for convicted servicemembers.  Reforms could benefit
convicted servicemembers by reducing systemic post-trial delays.
After concluding that military post-trial is both out of step with ci-
vilian post-trial and inefficiently consumes scarce military resources, this
Article examined why military post-trial is designed the way that it is.  In
other words, being different and expensive does not necessarily mean
military post-trial should change (provided that there is a good reason for
being different and expensive).  Instead, this Article argued that
lawmakers created the military post-trial to address the deficiencies of a
military justice system in which trained attorneys were largely absent.
243 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at A-1.
244 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); CRIMINAL LAW DEP’T, supra note 118,
at A-1 (explaining that the military justice system exists to enhance the nation’s warfighting
capabilities as well as accomplish the traditional goals of a justice system).
245 See CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 118, at A-1 (explaining that the military
justice system exists to enhance the nation’s warfighting capabilities as well as accomplish the
traditional goals of a justice system).
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Many of the military’s expensive post-trial processes exist because
lawmakers have not yet updated the rules to reflect the seismic shifts that
have occurred over the past four decades.
Finally, this Article proposed a menu of potential reforms intended
to increase the efficiency of the military post-trial system, while continu-
ing to provide convicted servicemembers with protections that far exceed
their civilian counterparts.  The proposed reforms include: (1) easing the
requirements for multiple attorneys to review transcripts, (2) eliminating
promulgating orders, (3) creating two tracks for automatic appellate re-
view, (4) adopting an opt-in system for OTJAG review of courts-martial,
and (5) adopting an opt-in system for appellate review of guilty pleas.
By adopting the proposed reforms, the military could fund significant
additional warfighter capabilities without jeopardizing the rights of con-
victed servicemembers.
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APPENDIX A:
COMPARING TWO POST-TRIAL SYSTEMS: CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY
CONVICTION VS. MILITARY GUILTY PLEA FOR MARIJUANA USE
To illustrate the scope of the problem, the following table compares the post-trial
process that follows a civilian’s death penalty conviction in California’s state courts
against the post-trial process that follows a Soldier’s guilty plea for marijuana use in the
military.1  In seven of ten categories, the Soldier’s misdemeanor-level guilty plea triggers
a post-trial process that exceeds the protections afforded to a civilian condemned to die.
The post-trial process is roughly equivalent in the remaining three categories.
California Death
Penalty Military Misdemeanor
(Contested Trial) (Guilty Plea)
Automatic review by appellate Yes2 Yes3
court
Appellate defense attorney No4 Yes5
appointed at no cost to con-
victed (regardless of ability to
pay)
Likely duration of appellate Years6 Years7
process
Verbatim transcript of all court Yes8 Yes9
proceedings required
Who must review the verbatim Court reporter All trial judges who presided
transcript before it is authenti- only10 over any portion of the proceed-
cated? ings, prosecutor, defense coun-
sel, court reporter11
Number of authorities with 112 413
power to grant clemency
Restrictions on authority’s abil- Governor may Largely unfettered authority to
ity to grant clemency only consider grant clemency15
certain factors
and must obtain
approval from
California
Supreme Court
in certain cir-
cumstances14
What triggers clemency review? Petition from Automatic (no action needed by
convicted16 convicted)17
Must a senior attorney review No18 Yes (staff judge advocate rec-
the record of trial and make ommendation)19
clemency recommendations
before the verdict is approved?
For those sentenced to confine- No20 Yes (known as deferment or
ment, does the government con- waiver of forfeitures)21
tinue to pay the convicted’s
salary to him until the appeals
phase is complete?
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1 Assume the convicted Soldier is sentenced to reduction in grade, total forfeiture of
pay, one month confinement, and a bad-conduct discharge at a general court-martial.
2 CAL. R. CT. 8.600(a).
3 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1201 (2012) [hereinafter
MCM].
4 California provides appellate defense attorneys at taxpayer expense only to indigent
defendants. See CAL. R. CT. 8.605; see also Death Penalty Cases, CAL. COURTS, http://www
.courts.ca.gov/5641.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
5 MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1202.
6 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF CAL., A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL
CASE PROCESS 2, http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2015).
7 See E-mail from Homan Barzmehri, Management and Program Analyst, Army Court
of Criminal Appeals, to author (Jan. 22, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that the aver-
age time from sentence until a case is received at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals was
231 days in 2014); E-mail from Homan Barzmehri, Management and Program Analyst, Army
Court of Criminal Appeals, to author (Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that the
average processing time for an appeal at the Army Court of Criminal Appeals is 339 days); see
also United States v. Grimes, Army 201007202014, CCA LEXIS 63 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan.
31, 2014), rev. denied, No. 14-0493, 2014 CAAF LEXIS 829 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 11, 2014) (ex-
ceeding four years of post-trial processing).
8 CAL. R. CT. 8.610–.622.
9 MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1103.
10 CAL. R. CT. 8.320, 8.336–.344, 8.619.  For all felony convictions, the court reporter
prepares and certifies the written transcript. See id.  The clerk of the trial court prepares and
certifies the portion of the record that includes the papers, documents, and exhibits used at
trial. See id.  After the clerk delivers the certified transcripts, each counsel reviews the docket
sheets and minute orders to determine whether the reporter’s transcript is complete and re-
views the court file to determine whether the clerk’s transcript is complete. See id.  The rules
do not require counsel for either party to read the entire reporter’s transcript. See id.  If any
counsel files a request for additions or corrections, then the judge must also certify the record
as complete. CAL. R. CT. 8.619.
11 MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1103, 1104(a).  The requirement for trial defense counsel
to review transcripts prior to authentication is based in local and regional Trial Defense Ser-
vice policy.  This assertion is based on the author’s professional experiences across eight years
of military justice practice as a trial counsel, defense counsel, senior trial counsel, command
judge advocate, and chief of military justice from 2007 to 2014.
12 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.  The President’s pardon authority is limited to federal of-
fenses. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing pardon authority to the President); MCM, supra
note 3, R.C.M. 1107, 1201 (2012) (providing clemency authority to the convening authority
and the service Judge Advocate General); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-130, ARMY CLEM-
ENCY AND PAROLE BOARD, ¶ 2-2 (1998) (providing for clemency through the Army Clemency
and Parole Board and the Secretary of the Army).  However, Congress recently imposed addi-
tional limitations on the convening authority’s clemency powers for sexual assault convictions,
adjudged sentences that exceed six months confinement or including a punitive discharge, or
convictions for offenses that include a maximum punishment exceeding two years confine-
ment.  These new limitations apply to offenses that occurred on or after June 2014.  National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–66, § 1702, 127 Stat. 672,
954–958 (2013) [hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014].
14 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.  For example, the California Supreme Court must recommend
granting a pardon before the Governor can pardon an applicant who has been convicted of
more than one felony.  Id. Also, the Governor may only consider certain factors when acting
on a murder case with a sentence to an indeterminate term of confinement. Id.; see also
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, STATE OF CAL., HOW TO APPLY FOR A PARDON (2013), https://www
.gov.ca.gov/docs/How_To_Apply_for_a_Pardon.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
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15 The President’s clemency power is restricted only as to impeachment. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2.  The Judge Advocate General’s clemency power is unqualified. MCM, supra note
3, R.C.M. 1201(b)(3).  Clemency is “within the sole discretion of the convening authority” and
“is a matter of command prerogative.” MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1107(b)(1).  However,
Congress recently imposed additional limitations on the convening authority’s clemency pow-
ers for sexual assault convictions, adjudged sentences that exceed six months confinement or
including a punitive discharge, or convictions for offenses that include a maximum punish-
ment exceeding two years confinement.  These new limitations apply to offenses that occurred
on or after June 2014.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, supra note
13, § 1702.
16 OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, STATE OF CAL., supra note 14.
17 MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1107, 1201.  Clemency by the convening authority or the
service Judge Advocate General can occur without any action from the convicted. MCM,
supra note 3, R.C.M. 1107, 1201.  However, the President of the United States rarely uses his
pardon authority unless requested by the convicted. See Standards for Consideration of Clem-
ency Petitioners, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/about-office-0 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2015).
18 See CAL. R. CT. 4.1–.700, 8.1–.1125.
19 MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1106, 1107.
20 See CAL. R. CT. 4.1–.700, 8.1–.1125.
21 See MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 1101.
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APPENDIX B:
SURVEY OF CIVILIAN POST-TRIAL SYSTEMS
Automatic
Appellate
Court
Review of
All Who Reviews
Sentences Written Transcript Who Certi-
to Con- Mandatory Transcript Before Certifi- fies/Authenti-
finement Attorney Prepared cation/ cates the
for One Review of for All Authentication Transcript
Year or All Con- Convic- After Convic- After Convic-
Jurisdiction More victions tions tion1 tion
Military Yes2 Yes3 Yes4 Court All Trial
Justice Reporter, Pros- Judges Who
System ecuting Attor- Presided Over
ney, Defense a Portion of
Counsel, All the Court-
Trial Judges5 Martial6
Federal No7 No8 No9 Court Reporter Court
District Court Only10 Reporter
Only11
Alabama No12 No13 No14 Court Reporter Court
Only15 Reporter
Only16
Alaska No17 No18 No19 Court Reporter Court
Only20 Reporter
Only21
Arizona No22 No23 No24 Court Reporter Court
Only25 Reporter
Only26
Arkansas No27 No28 No29 Clerk of Trial Clerk of Trial
Court or Court Court Only31
Reporter
Only30
California No32 No33 No34 Court Reporter Court
Only35 Reporter
Only36
Colorado No37 No38 No39 Court Reporter Court
Only40 Reporter
Only41
Connecticut No42 No43 No44 Court Reporter Court
Only45 Reporter
Only46
Delaware No47 No48 No49 Court Clerk of Trial
Reporter50 Court51
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Florida No52 No53 No54 Court Reporter Court
or Convicted’s Reporter or
Counsel (only Convicted’s
if using spe- Counsel (only
cific transcrip- if using spe-
tionist cific trans-
requested by criptionist
counsel)55 requested by
counsel)56
Georgia No57 No58 No59 Court Reporter Court
Only60 Reporter and
Clerk of Trial
Court Only61
Hawaii No62 No63 No64 Court Reporter Court
Only65 Reporter
Only66
Idaho No67 No68 No69 Court Reporter Court
Only70 Reporter
Only71
Illinois No72 No73 No74 Court Reporter Court
or Trial Reporter or
Judge75 Trial Judge76
Indiana No77 No78 No79 Court Reporter Court
Only80 Reporter
Only81
Iowa No82 No83 No84 Court Reporter Court
Only85 Reporter
Only86
Kansas No87 No88 No89 Court Reporter Court
Only90 Reporter
Only91
Kentucky No92 No93 No94 Court Reporter Court
Only95 Reporter
Only96
Louisiana No97 No98 No99 Court Reporter Court
Only100 Reporter
Only101
Maine No102 No103 No104 Court Reporter Court
Only105 Reporter
Only106
Maryland No107 No108 No109 Court Reporter Court
Only110 Reporter
Only111
Massachusetts No112 No113 No114 Court Reporter Court
Only115 Reporter
Only116
Michigan No117 No118 No119 Court Reporter Court
Only120 Reporter
Only121
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Minnesota No122 No123 No124 Court Reporter Court
Only125 Reporter
Only126
Mississippi No127 No128 No129 Court Reporter Court
Only130 Reporter
Only131
Missouri No132 No133 No134 Court Reporter Court
Only135 Reporter
Only136
Montana No137 No138 No139 Court Reporter Court
Only140 Reporter
Only141
Nebraska No142 No143 No144 Court Reporter Court
Only145 Reporter
Only146
Nevada No147 No148 No149 Court Reporter Court
Only150 Reporter
Only151
New No152 No153 No154 Court Reporter Court
Hampshire Only155 Reporter
Only156
New Jersey No157 No158 No159 Court Reporter Court
Only160 Reporter
Only161
New Mexico No162 No163 No164 Court Reporter Court
Only165 Reporter
Only166
New York No167 No168 No169 Court Court
Reporter170 Reporter171
North No172 No173 No174 Court Reporter The Parties
Carolina Must Review; Agree on the
the Parties Contents of
May the Record on
Review175 Appeal by
Using the Set-
tlement Pro-
cedure176
North Dakota No177 No178 No179 Court Reporter Court
Only180 Reporter
Only181
Ohio No182 No183 No184 Court Reporter Court
Only185 Reporter
Only186
Oklahoma No187 No188 No189 Court Reporter Court
Only190 Reporter
Only191
Oregon No192 No193 No194 Court Reporter Court
Only195 Reporter
Only196
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Pennsylvania No197 No198 No199 Court Court
Reporter200 Reporter
(Trial Judge
Authenticates
Portions if
Objection)201
Rhode Island No202 No203 No204 Court Reporter Court
Only205 Reporter
Only206
South No207 No208 No209 Court Court
Carolina Reporter210 Reporter211
South Dakota No212 No213 No214 Court Reporter Court
Only215 Reporter
Only216
Tennessee No217 No218 No219 Court Court
Reporter, Reporter,
Appellant, or Appellant, or
Appellant’s Appellant’s
Counsel; Counsel;
Appellee May Review By
Review (Not Trial Judge Is
Mandatory)220 Discretion-
ary221
Texas No222 No223 No224 Court Reporter Court
Only225 Reporter
Only226
Utah No227 No228 No229 Court Reporter Court
Only230 Reporter and,
if applicable,
the Trans-
criber
Only231
Vermont No232 No233 No234 Court Reporter Court
Only235 Reporter
Only236
Virginia No237 No238 No239 Court Court
Reporter240 Reporter241
Washington No242 No243 No244 Court Court
Reporter245 Reporter246
West Virginia No247 No248 No249 Court Court
Reporter250 Reporter251
Wisconsin No252 No253 No254 Court Reporter Court
Only255 Reporter
Only256
Wyoming No257 No258 No259 Court Reporter Court
Only260 Reporter
Only261
1 The terms “authenticate” and “certify” are used interchangeably across jurisdictions.
Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3 (providing for certification of the accuracy of the record), with
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1103 (2012) [hereinafter MCM]
(providing for authentication of the accuracy of the record).
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2 The military service courts of criminal appeals automatically review every case that
results in a punitive discharge or confinement for one year, regardless of whether the convicted
actually requests appellate review. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1201.
3 In all courts-martial, the staff judge advocate (a senior military attorney) must provide
a written legal recommendation before the convening authority approves or disapproves the
results of the court-martial. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1106.  Additionally, an attorney at
the service’s Office of the Judge Advocate General reviews all court-martial convictions that
do not qualify for automatic appellate court review (that is, the sentence does not include a
punitive discharge or confinement for one year). MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1112.
4 In the military justice system, a court reporter must prepare a written transcript of all
proceedings in every court-martial that results in a conviction, regardless of the severity of the
sentence or whether the accused pled guilty. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1103.
5 In the military justice system, each transcript is reviewed by the court reporter, the
prosecuting attorney (i.e., trial counsel), the defense counsel, and each judge who presided
over a portion of the proceedings. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1103(i).  Trial counsel must
review every transcript prior to authentication. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1103(i).  While
the R.C.M. do not formally require defense counsel to review every transcript, it is a de facto
requirement for many trial defense counsel based on local and regional policies within the
Army’s Trial Defense Service.  This assertion is based on the author’s professional exper-
iences across eight years of military justice practice as a trial counsel, defense counsel, senior
trial counsel, command judge advocate, and chief of military justice from 2007 to 2014 [here-
inafter Professional Experiences].
6 In the military justice system, the transcript is authenticated by each trial judge who
presided over a portion of the proceedings. MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1103.
7 FED. R. APP. P. 3–4, 28.
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 753 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32–38.  After review of the cited author-
ities, the author has determined that the federal system has no procedures that are similar to the
staff judge advocate recommendation (SJAR) or post-conviction review by an attorney at the
Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG). See 28 U.S.C. § 753 (2012); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32–38.
9 FED. R. APP. P. 10–11. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b).  All criminal proceedings held in
open court are recorded by electronic sound recording, shorthand, or mechanical means.  How-
ever, court reporters only produce written transcripts upon request by the parties. FED. R. APP.
P. 10–11; see 28 U.S.C. § 753(b).  Generally, the convicted specifies which portions of the
recordings need to be transcribed to establish the issue on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 753; FED.
R. APP. P. 10.  In some cases the district court judge may order all or a portion of the proceed-
ings transcribed.  28 U.S.C. § 753(b).  The parties may avoid creating a written transcript by
agreeing on the issues or relying on the docket sheets. See FED. R. APP. P. 10.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 753; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32–38.
11 28 U.S.C. § 753.
12 ALA. R. APP. P. 3–4, 28.
13 See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26, 30–32; ALA. R. APP. P. 3–4.  After review of the cited
authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
14 See ALA. R. APP. P. 10.
15 See id. at R. 10, 11.
16 See id.
17 See ALASKA R. APP. P. 204, 212.
18 See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 32–35.2.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
19 See ALASKA R. APP. P. 210, 211.
20 See id. at R. 210.
21 See id.
22 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 31.2, 31.3.
23 See id. at 24–33.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that
this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
24 See id. at R. 31.8.
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25 See id. at R. 31.8–.9.
26 See id.
27 ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 2, 10.
28 See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33–37.4.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
29 See ARK. R. APP. P.  CRIM. 2(c), 4, 10; ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 6.
30 See ARK. R. APP. P.  CRIM. 2(c), 4; ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 6–7.
31 See ARK. R. APP. P.  CRIM. 2(c), 4; ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 6–7.
32 CAL. R. CT. 8.304, 8.308.  California’s rules for misdemeanor appeals are significantly
less favorable to the convicted than its rules for felony appeals. See JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
CAL., INFORMATION ON APPEAL PROCEDURES FOR MISDEMEANORS (2014), http://www.courts
.ca.gov/documents /cr131info.pdf.
33 See CAL. R. CT. 4.1–.700, 8.1–.1125.  After review of the cited authorities, the author
has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
34 CAL. R. CT. 8.320, 8.336–.344.  For felony convictions, the court reporter prepares a
written transcript only if the convicted appeals or if the trial judge determines that an appeal is
likely. See CAL. R. CT. 8.320, 8.336–.344.  To determine the likelihood of an appeal, the trial
judge considers the facts of the case, whether the defendant has been convicted of a crime for
which probation is prohibited, or if the trial involved a contested question of law important to
the outcome. Id.  The parties may forgo the creation of a transcript by entering into an agreed
statement. See id.  For misdemeanor convictions, the court reporter transcribes only those
portions of the record that the appellant requests. See JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CAL., supra note
32.
35 CAL. R. CT. 8.336(d).
36 Id. at R. 8.320, 8.336–.344.  For felony convictions, the court reporter prepares and
certifies the written transcript. Id. at R. 8.336(d).  The parties review the trial record for accu-
racy only for appeals from judgments of death. See id. at R. 8.336, 8.610–.622.
37 COLO. APP. R. 3, 4.
38 See COLO. APP. R. 1–46.7; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32–60.  After review of the cited au-
thorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
39 See COLO. APP. R. 10.
40 See id. at R. 10(a)(3).
41 See id.
42 See CONN. R. APP. P. §§ 61-6(1)(a), 63-3.
43 See CONN. R. CRIM. P. §§ 42-1 to 43-43.  After review of the cited authorities, the
author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
44 See CONN. R. APP. P. § 68-3; STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, HANDBOOK OF
CONNECTICUT APPELLATE PROCEDURE 11, 13 (2014) [hereinafter CONN. HANDBOOK] .
45 See CONN. R. APP. P. § 68-3; CONN. HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 11.
46 See CONN. R. APP. P. § 68-3; CONN. HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 11.
47 See DEL. R. SUP. CT. 6–7(a).  Delaware requires automatic review for death sentence
penalties. See id. at R. 35(a).
48 See DEL. R. SUP. CT. 1–44; DEL. CRIM. P. R. 31–61.  After review of the cited authori-
ties, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
49 See DEL. R. SUP. CT. 9, 26(f).  Delaware requires an automatic verbatim transcript of
the entire trial only for death penalty convictions. Id. at R. 35(c)(iii); see id. at R. 9.  For class
A felony convictions, the trial judge orders transcription of the trial (excluding opening and
closing arguments and jury selection) and designates the party responsible for paying the costs
of transcription. Id. at R. 9(e)(i), 26(f).  The trial judge may modify or narrow the scope of the
transcript order upon motion or sua sponte. See id.  Class A felonies are crimes with a mini-
mum term of incarceration of fifteen years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.  11
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(1) (2014).  For all felony convictions other than class A
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felonies, the court reporter transcribes only those portions of the record that the parties request.
DEL. R. SUP. CT. 9, 26(f).
50 See DEL. R. SUP. CT. 9(e)(ii), 9(e)(iv).
51 Id.
52 FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)–(c), 9.200.
53 See id. at R. 9.040, 9.140; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.440–.853.  After review of the cited
authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
54 See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140, 9.200, 9.400(a)(2).
55 See id. at R. 9.140(f)(2), 9.200(b), 9.200(d).
56 Id.
57 See GA. CT. APP. R. 5, 11, 22, 25, 32.
58 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-9-1 to 17-10-20 (2014).  After review of the cited authori-
ties, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
59 See id. §§ 15-6-80, 5-6-37, 5-6-41, 5-6-42, 17-8-5; GA. CT. APP. R. 5, 11, 17–19.  For
misdemeanor convictions, the court reporter prepares a written transcript of only those por-
tions of the record that the convicted requests. See GA. CODE ANN. §5-6-41(b) (2014); cf. GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-8-5.  The court reporter prepares a written transcript of all felony convictions.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-5(a).  However, the written transcript does not include argument
by counsel. Id.  For felony trials that do not result in felony convictions, the court reporter
records the trial using electronic or stenographic means but does not prepare a written tran-
script. See id.  The parties do not need to create a transcript if only questions of law are at
issue or if they enter into an agreed statement of the facts and issues. See id. §§ 5-6-37, 5-6-
41(i).  The state pays the transcription costs for felony convictions, but the convicted pays
transcription costs for misdemeanor convictions and interlocutory appeals (unless the court
finds the convicted indigent). See id. §§ 15-6-80, 17-8-5; GA. R. CT. APP. R. 5.
60 See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-14-5.
61 Id.; GA. CT. APP. R. 17, 19.
62 See HAW. R. APP. P. 3, 4(a).
63 See HAW. R. PENAL P. 31–55.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
64 See HAW. R. APP. P. 10.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See IDAHO APP. R. 11, 14, 17.
68 See IDAHO CRIM. R. 31–36.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
69 See IDAHO APP. R. 17, 24–25.
70 See id. at R. 26, 28.
71 Id.
72 See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 605, 606.
73 See id. at R. 430–51, 602–51.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
74 See id. at R. 471, 605–08.
75 Id. at R. 608.
76 Id. (noting that either a court reporter or the trial judge may certify the transcript).
77 See IND. R. APP. P. 9, 46.
78 See IND. R. CRIM. P. 15–24.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
79 See IND. R. APP. P. 9; IND. R. CRIM. P. 5, 10.
80 See IND. R. APP. P. 27, 28.
81 Id.
82 See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101–.102, 6.903.
83 See IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.22–.37.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
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84 See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.801–.804.  Court reporters automatically prepare verbatim tran-
scripts only in limited circumstances, such as transcribing the testimony pursuant to a grant of
immunity. See, e.g., IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.20b.
85 See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.801–.804.
86 Id.
87 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3606, 22-3608(c), 60-2103 (2009); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 2.04,
6.02.
88 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3401–22-3612.  After review of the cited authorities, the
author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
89 KAN. SUP. CT. R. 2.04, 3.01–.07.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02, 12.04; KY. R. CIV. P. 76.42.  The appellate court may
award damages if it determines the convicted’s appeal is frivolous. KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02;
KY. R. CIV. P. 73.02(4).
93 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.82–.88, 11.02–.42.  After review of the cited authorities, the
author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
94 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02, 12.04, 13.04; KY. R. CIV. P. 73.08, 75.01, 75.06–.15, 76.
95 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02; KY. R. CIV. P. 73.08, 75.01, 75.06–.15.
96 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02; KY. R. CIV. P. 73.08, 75.01, 75.06–75.15.
97 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 914 (2014); LA. UNIF. R. CT. APP. 2-12.4.
98 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 810–905.8.  After review of the cited authorities,
the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
99 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 843, 914, 914.1; LA. UNIF. R. CT. APP. 2-1 to 2-
1.17.  The requesting party’s attorney must “certify that there are good grounds for [transcrip-
tion of the requested portion of the trial] in light of the assignment of errors to be urged.” LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 914, 914.1.
100 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 918.
101 See id.
102 ME. R. APP. P. 2, 8, 9.
103 See ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 32–38.  After review of the cited authorities, the author
has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
104 ME. R. APP. P. 2, 5, 6, 8.
105 See id. at R. 5, 6.
106 See id.
107 MD. CODE ANN., MD. RULES §§ 8-201 to 8-202, 8-501 to 8-505 (West 2015).
108 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-101 to 6-106, 6-216 to 8-109 (West 2015).
After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has no proce-
dures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
109 MD. CODE ANN., MD. RULES §§ 8-203, 8-411 to 8-413.  Maryland “strongly en-
courage[s]” the parties to agree to narrow the scope of the transcription to only the testimony
necessary for the appeal. Id. § 8-413.
110 See id. §§ 8-411 to 8-413.
111 See id.
112 MASS. R. APP. P. 3, 4(b), 16.
113 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 27–30.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
114 See MASS. R. APP. P. 8, 16.
115 See id. at R. 8, 9.
116 See id.
117 MICH. CT. R. 7.204, 7.212, 7.219.
118 See id. at R. 6.420–.509.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
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119 Id. at R. 6.425(G), 7.204, 7.210.
120 See id. at R. 7.210.
121 See id.
122 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.01, 28.02.
123 See id. at R. 26–28.06. After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined
that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
124 See id. at R. 28.01, 28.02.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 MISS. R. APP. P. 3–4, 6, 10, 32.
128 See MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. & CTY. CT. PRACTICE 11.01–.05.  After review of the cited
authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
129 See MISS. R. APP. P. 10–13.
130 See id.
131 Id.  The court reporter prepares and certifies the written transcript. Id.  The trial court
clerk prepares and certifies the remaining record on appeal. Id.  The convicted’s attorney must
also review the record and certify that it is correct and complete. Id.
132 See MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.11, 30.01, 30.04, 30.06, 81.04.
133 See id. at R. 19–36.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined
that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
134 See id. at R. 30.04; MO. SUP. CT. OPERATING R. 19.03.
135 See MO. SUP. CT. R. 30.04.
136 Id.
137 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-104 (2014); MONT. R. APP. P. 4, 6, 12.
138 See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-16-101 to 46-21-203.  After review of the cited authori-
ties, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
139 See id. §§ 3-5-60, 47-1-201; MONT. R. APP. P. 4, 6, 8, 9.
140 See MONT. R. APP. P. 6, 8.
141 Id.
142 NEB. CT. R. APP. P. §§ 2-101, 2-109.
143 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2201 to 29-4608 (after review of the cited authorities, the
author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review).
144 NEB. CT. R. APP. P. §§ 2-101, 2-104, 2-105.
145 See id. §§ 2-104, 2-105.
146 Id.
147 NEV. R. APP. P. 3, 4.
148 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.481–175.543 (2013).  After review of the cited authori-
ties, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
149 See NEV. R. APP. P. 3, 4, 9–13.
150 See id. at R. 9–13.
151 See id.
152 N.H. SUP. CT. R. 4, 5, 7, 16.
153 See N.H. R. CRIM. P. 25–34.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
154 N.H. SUP. CT. R. 13–15, 59; N.H. R. CRIM. P. 33.
155 See N.H. SUP. CT. R. 13–15, 59.
156 See id.
157 N.J. CT. R. 2:3–2:6.
158 See id. at R. 3:19–3:30.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
159 See id. at R. 2:5–2:6.
160 See id.
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161 See id.  The court reporter prepares and certifies the written transcript. See id.  The
record on appeal (called the “appendix”) is prepared by the convicted’s attorney or both parties
jointly. See id.
162 N.M. R. APP. P. 12-201 to -202, 12-213.
163 See N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-611 to 5-831.  After review of the cited authorities,
the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
164 See N.M. R. APP. P. 12-209, 12-211; N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-704.
165 See N.M. R. APP. P. 12-209, 12-211, 12-212; see also N.M. R. APP. P. 22-301.
166 See N.M. R. APP. P. 22-301.
167 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 450.10, 460.10, 460.70 (McKinney 2014); see also N.Y. CT. APP.
R. 500.9, 500.12–.13.
168 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 330.10–470.60.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
169 See id. at R. 450.1, 460.70.
170 See id. at R. 460.70.
171 See id.
172 See N.C. R. APP. P. 4. See also id. at R. 28 (indicating function and content for
appeals).
173 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1331 to 15A-1340.23 (2014).  After review of the cited
authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
174 See N.C. R. APP. P. 4, 7, 9, 11–12.
175 See id. at R. 7, 9, 11–12.  The court reporter or transcriptionist prepares the written
transcripts requested by the parties. See id. at R. 7.  After completion of any transcripts re-
quested by the parties, the parties go through a process called “settlement” to agree upon a
proposed record on appeal. See id. at R. 11. The rules do not require the parties to read all
verbatim transcripts; instead, the parties have the option to read the verbatim transcripts during
the settlement process. See id.
176 See id. at R. 7, 9, 11–12.  The court reporter or transcriber prepares the written tran-
scripts requested by the parties. See id. at R. 7, 11.  After the requested transcripts are com-
pleted, the parties go through a process called “settlement” to agree upon a proposed record on
appeal. See id. at R. 11.
177 See N.D. R. APP. P. 3, 4, 28.
178 See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32–38 (after review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review).
179 See N.D. R. APP. P. 10(b). Further, North Dakota encourages the parties to agree to
limit the scope of the transcript. See id. at R. 10(b)(3) (providing a penalty for unreasonably
refusing to stipulate to exclude unnecessary portions of the record).
180 See id. at R. 10(e).
181 Id.
182 See OHIO R. APP. P. 3, 4(A), 16; see also OHIO CRIM. R. P. 32(B) (referencing notifi-
cation to defendant of right to appeal if applicable).
183 See OHIO CRIM. R. P. 31–36.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
184 See OHIO R. APP. P. 3, 9–11; OHIO CRIM. R. P. 22.
185 See OHIO R. APP. P. 9(b)(6) (requiring the transcriber to certify the transcript as cor-
rect); see also id. at R. 9(b)(2) (stating that a court reporter is sufficient for transcribing the
proceedings).
186 Id.
187
 See OKLA. R. CRIM. APP. 2.1, 3.5.
188 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 914–982a (2014).  After review of the cited authorities,
the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
189 See OKLA. R. CRIM. APP. 2.2, 2.5.
190 Id. at R. 2.2.
191 Id.
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192 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.012, 138.040, 138.071 (2014); OR. R. APP. P. 1.05, 2.05, 5.45.
193 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510–.686.  After review of the cited authorities, the author
has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG
review.
194 See OR. R. APP. P. 3.05–.45.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See PA. R.A.P. 123, 902–904, 1941, 2111.
198 See PA. R. CRIM. P. 648–910.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
199 See PA. R.A.P. 904, 1911–1924; see also id. at R. 115.
200 See id. at R. 1922.  The court reporter prepares the written transcript and provides
notice of completion to the parties. Id. The parties have the option to review the written
transcript before the court reporter certifies it. Id. If the parties do not object to the contents of
the written transcript within five days, the court reporter certifies the transcript. Id. The trial
judge examines and certifies portions of the written transcript only if there is an objection. Id.
201 See supra note 200.
202 See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. APP. P. 3, 4, 16.
203 See 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-18-1 to 12-19-39, 12-19.3-4 (2014).  After review of the
cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to
the SJAR or OTJAG review.
204 See R.I. SUP. CT. R. 3, 10–11.
205 See id. at R. 10–11.
206 See id.
207 See S.C. APP. CT. R. 201, 203, 208, 243.
208 See S.C. R. CRIM. P. 14, 16–20, 22–24, 28–30, 37.  After review of the cited authori-
ties, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or
OTJAG review.
209 See S.C. APP. CT. R. 207–09.  South Carolina encourages the parties to agree to limit
the scope of the transcript. See id. at R. 207(a)(1) (providing a penalty for parties unreasona-
bly refusing to stipulate to exclude unnecessary portions of the record).  Further, each party’s
attorney must certify that his designation of matters to be included in the record of trial con-
tains no matter which is irrelevant to the appeal. Id. at R. 209.
210 See id. at R. 207.
211 See id.  The court reporter prepares the written transcript. Id.  Additionally, the con-
victed or his attorney certifies that the record on appeal “contains all material proposed to be
included by any of the parties and not any other material.” Id. at R. 210.
212 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-9, 23A-32-2, 23A-32-15, 23A-32-16 (2014);
see also id. §§ 15-26A-14, 15-26A-60, 23A-32-14.
213 See id. §§ 23A-26-1 to 23A-27-52, 23A-29-1 to 23A-33-6.  After review of the cited
authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the
SJAR or OTJAG review.
214 See id. §§ 23A-32-1, 23A-32-14, 15-26A-47 to 15-26A-56.  The trial court orders a
written transcript of the trial when necessary to protect the convicted party’s rights. Id. § 23A-
32-1.  For other criminal convictions, the court reporter prepares a written transcript if re-
quested by the parties upon appeal. Id. §§ 15-26A-48, 23A-32-14.  The parties may limit
transcription to include only those portions of the record that are necessary to the issues on
appeal. Id. §§ 15-26A-50, 23A-32-14.  The parties may forgo the creation of a transcript by
entering into an agreed statement of the facts and issues. Id. §§ 15-26A-55, 23A-32-14.
215 See id. §§ 15-26A-55, 23A-32-14.
216 Id.
217 TENN. R. APP. P. 1, 3–5, 27.  The court discourages frivolous criminal appeals. See
TENN. R. CRIM. CT. APP. 22.
218 See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 31–38 (after review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review).
219 See TENN. R. APP. P. 1, 24–26.
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220 See id. at 1, 24.  The court reporter, appellant, or appellant’s counsel certifies the
transcript as an accurate account of the proceedings. Id.  The court reporter or appellee certi-
fies the portions of the transcript that the appellee requested. See id.  The trial judge must
approve and authenticate the record on appeal within thirty days or it is deemed approved. Id.
221 See supra note 220.
222 TEX. R. APP. P. 1.1, 25.2, 26.2, 38.
223 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.01 to 37.07, 40.001 to 43.26 (West 2013).
After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has no proce-
dures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
224 See TEX. R. APP. P. 12–13, 34–35.  Texas rules encourage the parties to limit the
scope of the transcript. See id. at R. 34.6(c)(3) (providing a penalty for a party that orders
transcription of portions of the record that are unnecessary to the appeal).
225 See id. at R. 35.3.
226 Id.
227 UTAH R. APP. P. 1, 3–4, 9, 24.
228 See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17, 21–28.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
229 See UTAH R. APP. P. 1, 3, 11–12.
230 See id. at R. 12.
231 Id.
232 VT. R. APP. P. 1, 3, 4, 28.
233 See VT. R. CRIM. P. 31–39 (after review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review).
234 See VT. R. APP. P. 3, 10–12.
235 See id. at 10(b).
236 See id.
237 VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:1, 5A:6, 5A:9, 5A:22, 5A:26 to 5A:27.
238 See VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 19.2-295 to 19.2-316.3 (2014); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15 to
3A:25.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has determined that the state has no
procedures similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
239 See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:3, 5A:1, 5A:6 to 5A:8, 5A:10.
240 See id.
241 See id.  Certifying the transcript becomes the trial judge’s responsibility if a party
objects that the contents of the transcript are erroneous or incomplete. See id. at R. 5A:8.
242 WASH. R. APP. P. 1.1, 5.1–.3, 10.3; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (2014)
(providing mandatory appellate review for sentences to death).
243 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.61.003–.64.140, 10.73.010–.900.  After review of the
cited authorities, the author has determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to
the SJAR or OTJAG review.
244 Id. §§ 10.64.100, 10.95.110; WASH. R. APP. P. 1.1, 9.1–9.8.
245 See WASH. R. APP. P. 1.1, 9.1–9.8.  The parties have ten days to object to the contents
of a transcript after the reporter prepares it. Id. at R. 9.5(c).
246 See id. at R. 1.1, 9.1–9.8.
247 W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 37; W. VA. R. APP. P. 1, 5, 10.
248 See W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 1, 31–39.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
249 See W. VA. R. APP. P. 1(b), 5(h), 6(b), 9(a).
250 See id. at R. 9(f).
251 See id.
252 WIS. STAT. §§ 808.03(1), 808.04(1), 809.19(1), 809.30(2)(b), 974.02(1) (2014).
253 See id. §§ 973.01–974.06.  After review of the cited authorities, the author has deter-
mined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
254 WIS. STAT. § 809.15(1)(a); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 71.01–.04.
255 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 71.04(6), 71.04(10)(b).
256 Id.
257 WYO. R. APP. P. 1.02(a), 2.01(a), 2.07; WYO. R. CRIM. P. 38.
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258 See WYO. R. CRIM. P. 31–39.  After review of the cited authority, the author has
determined that this state has no procedures that are similar to the SJAR or OTJAG review.
259 WYO. R. APP. P. 2.05–.07; WYO. R. CRIM. P. 55.
260 See WYO. R. APP. P. 3.02(d).
261 Id.
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